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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces a background problem in packet forwarding
cooperation in multi-domain wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and highlights the
significance of resource allocation using game theoretic reinforcement learning
(GTRL) technique. It also presents the motivation for applying GTRL technique to
achieve the best mutual policy for all network domains which is the main focus of this
thesis.
1.1 Significance of the problem
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have increasingly attracted much interest
in a wide range of application scenarios in recent years (Mattern et al., 2010; Fadel et
al., 2015; Rashid et al., 2016). For certain applications, it is possible that multiple
sensor networks which are controlled by different authorities can coexist
independently within a region of interest. These networks may even be physically
overlapping and their sensor nodes may be interleaved. Such networks are referred to
as multi-domain WSNs. The networks perform different tasks and measure different
data within the same area. Examples of multiple networks co-located deployments can
be found in environmental monitoring with forest fire, earthquake, wildlife tracking
and landslide detection sensors, and in animal monitoring with each herd belongs to a
different owner.
2Normally, WSNs consists of distributed autonomous sensor nodes that are
often deployed in remote or hostile environments to collect and send data packet
through multi-hop wireless communication to a sink in its own domain. However,
these sensor nodes usually have limitation in memory size, computational capabilities
and energy capacity. Since the most common energy storage device used in a sensor
node is a battery which is an energy constraint, changing new battery or sensor nodes
may be difficult to do in many applications. In such situations, cooperation among
sensor nodes belonging to different network authorities could potentially gain certain
benefits. Such benefits include alternative routing paths and reduced energy
consumption, which can prolong their network lifetime and enhance reliability of
packet delivery. These benefits lead to development of a new protocol with features
needed in a short duration and implementation with a small cost.
However, a significant amount of energy is also lost when sensor nodes within
the multi-domain WSN cooperatively process and forward the data for other
networks. As energy consumption is a critical issue for such networks, reducing
energy consumption and prolonging the network lifetime are important targets as
shown in the following researches.
1.1.1 Cooperative routing among multi-domain WSNs
With several advantages to be gained from cooperative routing in
multi-domain networks, many routing approaches have been proposed to achieve
optimized energy usage in multi-domain WSNs. Most existing researches consider
resource allocation problem in a fully cooperative situation, meaning that, the
authorities have to agree on sharing or providing a common resource in order to
3increase certain benefits for their networks. In (Bicakci et al., 2013 and Bicakci et al.,
2010), the potential benefits of cooperation in multiple WSNs are investigated. Linear
programming is employed to find an energy efficient path in order to prolong their
network lifetime. However, energy efficient routing selection is not always
guaranteed to prolong the network lifetime. Sensor nodes belonging to energy
efficient path tend to have higher traffic load and consume more energy than other
nodes. As a result, such nodes tend to die earlier. In order to avoid heavy loaded
situations, Nagata et al. (2012) proposed cooperation between multi-domain WSNs by
balancing the communication load. Routes with the maximum value of bottleneck
were selected. By doing this, the network lifetime can be extended among multiple
domains within the same geographic area. Kinoshita et al. (2016) proposed a fair
cooperative routing method for heterogeneous overlapped WSNs called pool-based
selecting method. An energy pool was introduced to maintain the total amount of
energy consumption used in cooperative forwarding. Their simulation results showed
that the proposed method was able to balance the energy consumption and prolong the
network lifetime. Ref. (Jelicic et al., 2014; Singhanat et al., 2015) showed benefits of
node collaboration in multi-domain WSNs under practical implementation. The
results showed that cooperation with co-located sensor devices in different networks
can indeed increase the network lifetime.
However, Vaz et al., (2008) and Ze et al., (2012) showed that
cooperation between different networks that are deployed in the same region may not
always be beneficial to every network. It is possible that some WSNs can prolong
their network lifetime but shorten lifetimes of other WSNs. In Ze et al., (2012), it has
been reported that the presence of only a few selfish nodes can degrade the
4performance of an entire system. Thus, encouraging nodes to be cooperative and
helpful in detecting selfish nodes in packet transmission is critical to ensure the proper
functioning of multi-domain WSNs. Vaz et al., (2008) showed that cooperation
between two authorities in co-located areas may not always be beneficial to any
network, because whether or not each authority will cooperate depends on the
configuration of each network. Their results showed that there are four factors which
affect node cooperation, i.e. the density of the network, the data collection rate, the
path loss exponent and the routing algorithm. Hence, node cooperation between
different authorities in multi-domain WSNs is not straight forward.
Furthermore, multi-domain WSNs also consider fair cooperative
packet forwarding for each authority in order to efficiently decide whether to
cooperate with each other or not. This is of particular significance in a non-
cooperative environment in order to provide fairness and benefits to all co-located
networks.
1.1.2 Fair routing in multi-domain WSNs
Many researches try to find a routing algorithm which can rationally
decide to select the best routing policy in presence of non-cooperative behavior of
sensor node in multi-agent WSNs. The tools which are usually employed to select
suitable strategies for sensor node in WSNs are non-cooperative game algorithm
(Lasaulce and Tembine, 2011) and reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
1.1.2.1 Non-cooperative game theory
A well-known technique to encourage cooperation among
selfish nodes is non-cooperative game theory. Non-cooperative game theory is a
branch of game theory which involves interactive decision situations in which
5multiple decision makers, each one with its own objectives, jointly determine the
outcome. Game theory can be used to analyze the agent interaction and determine a
set of strategies among rational agents, where each agent uses available information to
decide its behavior. The major advancement that has driven much of the development
of game theory is the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) which is used to determine a
suitable and fair strategy for all agents. NE is a set of strategies for each of the agents
such that each agent’s strategy is the best-response to the other agents’ strategies.
Many researches focus on the problem of stimulating cooperation. Ref. (Wu and Shu,
2005) applied game theory to routing problem in multi-domain WSNs. They assumed
multiple sensor networks under the control of different authorities and used incentive
mechanisms to motivate cooperation between sensor nodes. Their approach can be
applied in routing and aggregation problems for optimizing the power usage and
lifetime of the network. On the other hand, Felegyhazi et al., (2005) applied the Non-
cooperative game algorithm to describe a situation that cooperation can exist in multi-
domain WSNs without incentive mechanisms. They formulate a packet forwarding
game into a non-cooperative resource allocation problem. The authors show that the
Non-cooperative game algorithm is a suitable framework which can determine
equilibrium strategy for their problem. However, one drawback of these approaches is
that obtaining a strategy needs significant amount of computational time to compute
the utility for all possible actions of sensor nodes. Similarly, Yang and Brown, (2007)
considered co-existing WSNs with two source nodes along with two corresponding
destination nodes.  A non-cooperative game algorithm is used to analyze the effect of
selfishness of sensor nodes on energy efficiency. In their game, each source node acts
as agent in a relaying game to send packets to its destination. Each source node
6decides to ask or not ask the other source to help relay packets. Their payoff is the
amount of energy saved. The results showed that natural cooperation without external
incentive mechanisms can occur and can achieve an energy efficiency path selection
policy in both fading and non-fading channel. However, their experiment investigated
a small network with two sensors and two separate sinks. Moreover, both (Felegyhazi
et al., 2005) and (Yang and Brown, 2007) are operated in a centralized manner which
are not scalable.
1.1.2.2 Reinforcement learning
In this thesis, we introduce the application of multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MARL), another technique to address the issue of resource
allocation problem in WSNs. MARL is suitable for distributed routing problems. In
the context of reinforcement learning (RL) framework, an agent systematically learns
correct behaviors online through trial-and-error interaction with other agent in a
dynamic environment in order to achieve a particular goal. There are several recent
researches which employ RL to solve routing problems in WSNs (Kulkarni et al.,
2011 and Al-Rawi et al., 2015). Each sensor node is assumed to be an agent.
Therefore, WSNs with multiple independent decision-making agents can be
considered as a in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) system. A standard RL
method called, Q-learning has been proposed to determine best routing strategies
when critical network conditions are allowed to vary dynamically. In (Yang et al.,
2013), a MARL-routing approach was proposed to handle sink mobility and enable
direct interactions between WSN and vehicles. Reward functions including time
delay, network lifetime and reliability was designed for MARL routing. Simulation
results show that their proposed approach achieved better time delay, energy
7distribution and delivery rate than often compared routing approaches. Refs. (Hu et
al., 2010, Xu et al., 2015 and Debowski et al., 2016) presented a load-balancing multi-
path routing approach. A MARL technique was employed to learn the best path to
forward packet which considered the number of hops, residual energy and energy
consumption of sensor nodes. Results showed that their approach can balance the
workload among sensor nodes and prolong the network lifetime. However, these
solutions were directly applied to single-domain WSNs.
There are only a few researches which focus on MARL
technique in multi-domain WSNs. Ref. (Rovcanin et al., 2014) applied Q-learning to
solve routing problem for cognitive networks such networks were co-located
heterogeneous WSNs which were fully cooperative and operating in a centralized
manner. MARL in a centralized manner was also proposed in (Singsanga et al., 2010),
by extending Q-routing to cater a non-cooperative multi-agent in a packet forwarding
problem. The authors applied an existing algorithm called Nash Q-learning (NashQ)
(Hu and Wellman, 2003) to attain the best mutual policy for all agents in a packet
forwarding game. Each agent attempts to learn its Nash equilibrium (NE) online.
Their results suggest that NashQ can adaptively learn and determine suitable packet
forwarding policy in varying network conditions. However, to the best of our
knowledge none of the existing MARL researches take into consideration of fair
routing selection in multi-domain WSNs under distributed manner. Since a
centralized packet forwarding rely on single computational node to receive and
process all sensor data, such operation creates a large amount of overhead rendering it
impractical for actual WSN applications (Li et al., 2011). Hence, there is a need for
8decentralized or distributed packet forwarding algorithms that allow sensors to
estimate their information locally to reduce the amount of overhead used.
This thesis therefore studies the cooperative fair routing
problem between multi-domain WSNs which are controlled by different authorities in
a distributed manner. The problem of how non-cooperative nodes belonging to
different network domains can locally decide to establish cooperative sharing path
with other networks without any external incentive mechanisms are taken into
consideration. This thesis also studies parameters that effect cooperation between
different network authorities and fairness of benefits that the networks can achieve.
For this purpose, this thesis focuses on applying MARL and non-cooperative game
theory to determine a fair packet forwarding strategy for all network authorities. The
underlying aim of this thesis is to propose a routing algorithm to cater a non-
cooperative multi-agent and to achieve the best mutual policy and improve the
network performance in distributed multi-domain WSNs. In order to achieve the aim,
this thesis firstly proposes a suitable payoff matrix for packet forwarding game. The
payoff matrix is then applied to the proposed Non-cooperative game algorithm based
on Lemke Howson method (NCG-LH) algorithm to conceptually show that non-
cooperative game theory can determine fair packet forwarding strategy and improve
the network performance in distributed multi-domain WSNs under common sink
(Chapter 3) and separate sink scenario (Chapter4). This thesis then extends the non-
cooperative game theory by adding learning mechanism based on game theoretic
reinforcement learning (GTRL). In particular, the thesis proposes two routing
algorithms (Chapter 5). The first algorithm is the discrete state Nash Q-learning (D-
NashQ) which is an extension of discrete state NashQ in centralized routing in
9(Singsanga et al., 2010) to cater a distributed multi-domain WSNs by using the
derived payoff matrix as a reward function. The other algorithm is the continuous
state Nash Q-learning (C-NashQ), that considers the state space in the framework as
continuous state, which is a suitable representation of the continuous state of the
remaining battery energy in the sensor nodes. This thesis also evaluates the proposed
algorithms by comparing them to existing algorithms and discusses the network
performance. The results show that the proposed algorithms can provide efficient and
fair packet forwarding policy that increase the network lifetime and reliability of
packet delivery ratio.
To conclude, the main contributions of this thesis are six-fold:
1) Identification of parameters that effect cooperation between multiple
co-located networks and fairness of benefits that the networks can achieve.
2) Design of payoff matrix for non-cooperative packet forwarding game
in distributed multi-domain WSNs
3) A non-cooperative game algorithm (NCG-LH) is proposed to
distributed packet forwarding scheme in non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs under
common sink and separate sink scenarios.
4) Proposal of two distributed routing algorithms (D-NashQ and C-
NashQ) and their application to the packet forwarding problems in multi-domain
WSNs under separate sink scenario.
5) Derivation of feature function that suitable for continuous state Nash
Q-learning.
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6) Fairness comparison in cooperative routing between routing algorithm
based on load balancing technique, non-cooperative game theory technique and game
theoretic reinforcement learning technique.
1.2 Research objectives
1.2.1 To identify the parameters that effect cooperation between multiple co-
located networks and fairness of benefits that the networks can achieve.
1.2.2 To apply non-cooperative game theory to allocate packet forwarding
problem in distributed multi-domain WSNs based on common sink and separate sink
scenarios.
1.2.3 To obtain a routing scheme which can achieve the best mutual packet
forwarding strategy in non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs in a distributed manner
using game theoretic reinforcement learning algorithm.
1.3 Assumptions
1.3.1 Cooperative packet forwarding is beneficial when the network is
sparse or when the environment is hostile.
1.3.2 Game theoretic multi-agent reinforcement learning provides more
efficiently network performance than the Non-cooperative game approach.
1.3.3 Sensor nodes in multi-domain WSNs can communicate with each other
using the same underlying protocol.
1.4 Scope and limitation
1.4.1 Multi-domain wireless sensor network consists of multiple co-located
WSNs.
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1.4.2 Decision methods for choosing the optimal packet forwarding strategy in
multi-domain WSNs will be studied.
1.4.3 Non-cooperative game theory and game theoretic reinforcement learning
(GTRL) methods will be studied and compared to achieve a suitable packet forwarding
strategy in multi-domain wireless sensor networks.
1.4.4 Simulations will be carried out by Visual C++. Six methods will be
compared, namely, 1) AODV non-cooperative routing, 2) AODV cooperative routing,
3) Pool-based routing algorithm (Kinoshita et al., 2016) 4) the proposed method on
Non-Cooperative Game based on Lemke Howson (NCG-LH) method,  and the
proposed method on game theoretic reinforcement learning algorithms namely, 5)
Discrete state Nash Q-learning (D-NashQ); and 6) Continuous state Nash Q-learning
(C-NashQ). The experimental results will be analyzed to find the suitable and fair
packet forwarding strategy.
1.5 Expected usefulness
1.5.1 A game theoretic multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm can be
applied to find the best mutual policy for packet forwarding in non-cooperative multi-
domain WSNs.
1.5.2 An optimal and fair packet forwarding strategy for non-cooperative
multi-domain wireless sensor networks.
1.6 Synopsis of thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the
theoretical background which is the foundation for the contributions of this thesis.
Firstly, the concept of non-cooperative game theory formulation and NCG-LH
12
algorithm are introduced. Secondly, the concept of the Markov decision process
formulation is reviewed. Next, game theoretic reinforcement learning technique used
for solving the packet forwarding problem called D-NashQ and C-NashQ algorithms
are introduced.
Chapter 3 presents a suitable payoff metric for packet forwarding game and
conceptually show that NCG-LH algorithm can be applied to allocate packet
forwarding problem in distributed multi-domain WSNs based common sink scenario.
In Chapter 4, the packet forwarding game is formulated and solved by the
NCG-LH algorithm for resource allocation problem between multi-domain WSNs in
separate sink scenario.
Chapter 5 proposes the game theoretic reinforcement learning techniques
called D-NashQ and C-NashQ algorithms in multi-domain WSNs. The packet
forwarding game was formulated and solved by D-NashQ and C-NashQ algorithms.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes all the original findings and contributions in
this thesis and points out possible future research directions.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND THEORY
2.1 Introduction
This thesis studies the cooperative fair routing problem in multi-domain
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). An important usage for multi-domain WSNs is
resource sharing between different authorities which can prolong their lifetime.
However, cooperative behavior between sensor nodes belonging to different
authorities may not always be readily available because sensor nodes may act
selfishly to conserve their energy. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that node
cooperation will be beneficial to all WSNs. Therefore, it is necessary to find an
algorithm for each authority to decide whether to cooperate with each other or not in a
non-cooperative multi-domain WSN.
This thesis applies non-cooperative game theory and reinforcement learning
(RL) to address the issue of non-cooperative resource allocation problem in multi-
domain WSNs. Non-cooperative game theory (Shoham and Brown, 2009) analyzes
the interaction and determine a set of strategies among rational selfish agents, where
each agent uses available information to decide its behavior for a given outcome. On
the other hands reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998) is a machine
learning scheme to provide a framework in which an agent learn the optimal policy
based on the agents’ past experiences without full information about the model of the
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environment. Non-cooperative game theory and RL thus are employed to encourage
cooperative fair routing between sensor nodes in multi-domain WSNs.
Therefore, this chapter serves as an introductory to important concepts of
game theory and then the fundamental theory of reinforcement learning which are the
basis of the contribution of this thesis.
2.2 The Agent definition
This thesis focus on the problem of packet forwarding cooperation in multi-
domain WSNs. In particular, a packet forwarding game is formulated into a non-
cooperative resource allocation problem. The term ‘agent’ in this thesis represents a
decision maker which decides an optimal route to forward the data packet. We assume
that the agent is rational, if given what the agent knows so far, the agent will always
choose a strategy which optimizes some performance measure.
In this thesis, the source node takes a role as an agent. The source node is
randomly selected from the set of sensor nodes in the WSN to send packets to the
base station (or sink node). The source node needs to decide which route obtains the
best benefit for its network domain. This thesis models a packet forwarding game as a
two-agent game. The example of the game is shown in Figure 2.1.  From the figure,
source node 11n , which is randomly selected from sensor nodes in network domain1, is
modeled as an agent in the game. The agent 11n must decide whether to use the non-
cooperative route which uses nodes in its own domain or the cooperative route that
consists of nodes from the other domain. To make a decision, the agent 11n assumes
that neighbor node 12n , which is a sensor node in a different network domain
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(domain2) belonging to cooperative route, as the other agent in game. The other
agent’s behaviors is expected to act rationlly.
Figure 2.1 Example of packet forwarding game
The optimal packet forwarding route is chosen by the source node depending
on strategy decision obtained from the proposed algorithms described in Chapter 3, 4
and 5.
2.3 Non-cooperative game
In recent years, game theory has gained much gaining attention in wireless
network researches because as it is powerful to analyze rational agent (or player)
behavior (Lasaulce and Tembine, 2011). Game theory has been successfully applied
in a wide range of problems spaces such as data routing (Fan et. al., 2016), power
control (Al-Zahrani et. al., 2016), wireless security system (Wang et. al., 2014) and
intrusion detection (Moosavi and Bui, 2014). Non-cooperative game theory is a
branch of game theory which involves interactive decision situations in which
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multiple decision makers, each one with its own objectives, jointly determine the
outcome of the decision.
In this thesis, Non-cooperative game theory has been applied in cooperative
routing problems, which is usually referred to as packet forwarding game, for multi-
domain WSNs. The idea behind the employment of non-cooperative game theory in
routing area is that the agents, e.g., sensor nodes in WSNs, which have a rational
selfish behavior, attempt to benefit themselves first when they are making packet
forwarding decisions. Thus, these selfish sensor node may prefers to drop a packet
from other different network domain rather than help to forward for conserving
limited energy resources since each data packet transmission has a cost for each
sensor node that participates in the route. The cooperative routing between multi-
domains can be broken if all nodes in different domain adopt this strategy. Under such
scenario, each agent needs to consider other agents' benefits while optimizing its own
benefits in making decisions in order to avoid failure in cooperation. Non-cooperative
game theory is capable of providing a set of mathematical tool to analyze such
complex interactions among rational selfish agents.
2.3.1 Game strategic form
Strategic form (or normal form) is a basic component in game theory,
which is defined by the tuple, ( , , )I A u where
 I denotes the set of agents, ,i I 1,...,i I
 1 ... IA A A   , where iA is the set of actions available to agent i , and tuple
1( ,..., )Ia a A is called an action profile, which describes the action each
agent has chosen.
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 1( ,..., )Iu u u , where iu is a real-valued payoff function for agent i .
This thesis refers agent i ’s opponents as “-i”. Note that we consider strategic
games with complete information, meaning that each agent has knowledge about all
the other agents’ payoff functions.
Appropriate strategies for the game can be determined by the
application of solution concepts, which determine. In other words, solution concepts
can determine what strategies for agents are suitable to adopt in the game. The most
widely used solution concept is Nash Equilibrium (NE). The next section, we will
describe concept of NE and method to find NE.
2.3.2 Nash equilibrium concept
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium (NE) is a solution concept of a
non-cooperative game which is used to determine a suitable and fair strategy for all
agents. NE is a set of strategies for each of agent such that each agent can correctly
expect about of the other agent’s behaviors, and acts rationally to this expectation.
Acting rationally signifies that the agent’s strategy is the best response to the other
agents’ strategies. For any game, NE is at least one solution exists in pure or mixed
strategies (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Given a set of strategies, if the agents choose to
take their action with probability 1, this implies that the agent is playing in a pure
strategy. On the other hand, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure
strategies. The agents need to select their action according to some probability.
In pure strategy NE, an agent selects an action which achieves the best
response to the other agent’s choice. In other words, a pure strategy NE is a point of
joint strategy in the stage game which every agent receives its highest payoff at this
point, and a change in strategies by any one of them would result in lower gains for
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that agent than the current strategy. Mathematically, the strategy profile * *1 ,..., Ia a is a
NE if for all agent i, *ia is the best response to the other agents’ choices
*
ia
* * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu a a u a a  (2.1)
where ( , )i i iu a a is payoff for agent i received after choose joint action ( , )i ia a and
i ia A
In general, the existence of a pure NE for the game cannot be
guaranteed. However, a mixed strategy NE always exists in finite games. Therefore, it
is necessary to extend the concept of NE to include mixed strategy NE in order to
analyze for solutions.
2.3.3 Generating Nash equilibrium using Lemke-Howson method
In this section, we will consider mixed strategy NE, which exists for
every finite game. A mixed strategy is a strategy in which an agent performs its
available pure strategies with certain probabilities. A mixed strategy NE profile
* *
1 ,..., I  is a NE if for every agent i,
*
i is the best response to the other agents’
choices *i ,
* * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i iu u     (2.2)
for each i i  ,when i is the probability distribution over agent i’s pure strategies.
In this thesis, the Lemke-Howson (LH) method (Sutton and Barto,
1998) is employed to calculate the probability to achieve the NE in a Non-cooperative
game. The LH method is the best known method to solve for mixed-strategy NE
between two agents. The advantage of LH method is that it is guaranteed to find at
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least one NE point. More details about using LH method to finds NE is shown in
Appendix A.
2.4 Multi-agent online learning approach
Reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998) is a machine learning
scheme in which an agent learns the optimal policy from the agents’ past experiences
without prior information about the model of the environment. Convergence of RL
relies on the assumption that the dynamics of environment satisfies a Markov
Decision Process (MDP). Therefore, this section start with a theoretical background
on MDP theory follow by a description of reinforcement learning and Nash Q-
learning.
2.4.1 Markov decision process theory
A Markov decision process (MDP) is the foundation for single-agent
reinforcement learning. MDP provides a framework for modelling that consists of a
decision-maker interacting synchronously with a signal from the environment called
the environment’s state. If the decision-maker sees the environment’s true state, it is
referred as a completely observable Markov decision process. The foundation of MDP
is presented as follows.
2.4.1.1 Markov property
The Markov property states that anything that has happened so
far can be summarized by the current state. Thus, the probability of being in the next
state at time t+1 based on the past history of state changes can be defined simply as
the conditional probability based on the current state at time t,
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1 1 0 0 1 1( | ,..., ) ( | ).t t t t t t t tP S s S s S s P S s S s         (2.3)
This equation is referred to as the Markov property. A state refers to information on
the environment that may be useful in making a decision. If the state has the Markov
property, then the environment’s state at time t+1 depends only on the state
representation at time t.
2.4.1.2 Markov Decision Process
A MDP is a discrete-time random decision process defined by a
set of states, actions and the one-step dynamics of environment. Given any state s and
action a, the probability of occurrence of each possible next state 1ts s  is
1( | , ) ( | , ).t t tP s s a P S s S s a a     (2.4)
This equation is called the state transition probability.
Similarly, given any current state and action, s and a, together with any next state, ,s
the expected value of the incurred reward is
1 1( , , ) [ | , , ],t t t tR s a s E r S s a a S s      (2.5)
where [ ]E  is the expectation operator and 1tr  is the reward received at time t +1.
Equation (2.4) and (2.5) completely specify the most important aspects of the
dynamics of the MDP. A MDP model is shown in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2 A MDP model.
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A tuple (S, A, P, R) is used to describe the MDP characteristics,
where S is the discrete set of environment states, A is the discrete set of possible
actions. In each time step t, the agent will observe the current state ts s S and
select an action .ta a A After taking action, the environment makes a transition
into a new state 1ts s S   according to the state transition probability
( | , )P s s a P  and then receives a feedback tr R which is a function of the reward
expected from the environment as a result of taking action a A . Let  be defined as
a mapping of the state space to the action space, : [ ]S P A  , where P[A] is the
distribution over the action space. The objective of solving a MDP is to find a policy
 that maximizes (or minimizes) some desired objective function. Such objective
function is defined as follows. Let ( , )tQ s a be defined as the action-value function of
a given policy  which associates state-action pair ( , )s a with an expected reward for
performing action a in state s at time step t and following  thereafter;
1
0
( , ) [ | , ]
             [ | , ],
t t t
t k t t
k
Q s a E R s s a a
E r s s a a
 
 

 

  
   (2.6)
where 1 2 2 3 1
0
...
t t t t k t k
k
R r r r r  

    

     is the expected discounted return of
the agent,  is the discount factor and [ ]E  is the expectation operator under policy
 .
The objective of MDP is to find a policy to select actions at a
given state such that the long term average reward is maximized. To achieve this,
particularly in scenarios where the dynamics of the environment is difficult to model
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(such as in WSNs), a technique called reinforcement learning can be used to solve
MDPs.
2.4.2 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a computational approach which
identifies how a system in a dynamic environment can learn to choose optimal actions
to achieve a particular goal. The learner is not taught which action to take, as in most
forms of machine learning, but instead must discover which actions yield the most
reward by trial-and-error interactions with its environment (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
In RL model, the learner or decision maker is called the agent.
Everything outside the agent is called environment. It uses a formal framework
defining the interaction between a learning agent and its environment in terms of
states ( ts ), actions ( ta ) and rewards ( tr ). The agent selects actions and the
environment responds to those actions. Furthermore, the environment also feed backs
to the agent rewards, as a consequence of the action selection at a given state, which
the agent tries to maximize over time. More specifically, the agent and environment
interact with each other in a sequence of discrete time steps. At each time step (t), the
agent receives some representation of the environment’s state ( ts ) and selects an
action ( ta ). One time step later, the agent receives a numerical reward ( 1tr  ) and finds
itself in a new state ( 1ts  ). Figure 2.3 shows the agent-environment interaction in
reinforcement learning.
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Figure 2.3 Diagram of agent-environment interaction in reinforcement learning.
2.4.2.1 The value function
Reinforcement learning algorithms are based on estimating
value functions. A value function is the expected sum of rewards received from
starting in state s. The value functions evaluate the performance of the decision which
the learner has taken at a given state. Since the rewards received in the future by the
learner depend on the actions which are taken, value functions are defined with
respect to each particular policy. Therefore, we can define the value function of a state
under a policy , ( ),V s as
( ) [ | ]t tV s E R s s  
1
0
               [ | ],k t k t
k
E r s s 

 

  (2.7)
where [ ]E  is the expectation operator under policy  . We call function V  the
state-value function.
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In RL, the agent attempts to improve its decision-making policy over time
in order to learn an optimal policy * ( )s for each state s, which is maximize the total
expected discounted reward over the long run. The optimal state-value function,
denoted as *( )V s , would therefore be the state value function which is maximum over
all possible policies at state s.
*( ) ( )V s V s 
max ( )V s

 (2.8)
1
0
max [ | ]k t k t
k
E r s s



 

 
1 2
0
max [r | ]t k t k t
k
E r s s

 

  

  
1 * 1max [ ( ) | ]t t tE r V s s s

   
*max ( | , )[ ( , , ) ( )]
a
s
P s s a R s a s V s

   
*max ( , ) ( | , ) ( )
a
s
R s a P s s a V s

    
 
 ,                      (2.9)
where ( | , )P s s a is the probability of transiting to next state s after taking action a at
state s. The quantity ( , )R s a is the expected next reward given the current state and
action, that is 1( , ) [ | s , ],t t tR s a E r s a a   and is related to ( , , )R s a s by
( , ) ( | , ) ( , , )
s
R s a P s s a R s a s

  . Equation (2.9) is called the Bellman optimality
equation for V  . This equation is also known as iterative policy evaluation
(Puterman, 1994).
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However, in many situations the state transition probability and reward
model in (2.9) is unknown. Therefore, such models can be learnt directly by an agent
interacting directly with the environment. Such approach is called model-free
reinforcement learning. One popular model free reinforcement learning technique
used in this thesis is presented next.
2.4.2.2 Q-learning
Q-learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) defines a learning method
within a MDP that is employed in single-agent RL systems. Q-learning is an
algorithm that does not need a model about the state transition probability and can
directly approximate the optimal action-value function (Q-value) through online
learning. We can define the right-hand side of Eq. (2.9) by
*( , ) ( , )Q s a Q s a 
( , ) ( | , ) ( )
s
R s a P s s a V s 

    (2.10)
where ( , )Q s a is the total discounted reward of taking action a at state s. Then, we
obtain
*( ) max ( , ).
a
V s Q s a   (2.11)
It can be seen that the optimal value function ( )V s is substituted into (2.10), we can
write the ( , )Q s a as a function of ( , )Q s a   as follows.
( , ) ( , ) ( | , ) max ( , )
a
s
Q s a R s a P s s a Q s a 

     (2.12)
Eq. (2.12) is called Bellman optimality equation for .Q 
In Q-learning, the agent tries to find the optimal ( , )Q s a by
iteratively updating the estimate ( , )Q s a . The basic idea in Q-learning is to estimate
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Q-value for actions based on feedback (reward) and agent’s Q-value function using
the observed information , , , .ts a r s  The update rule is based on temporal-difference
(TD) learning, which using Q-values and the Q-learning estimated from the next state
in order to update ( , )tQ s a to 1( , )tQ s a . Q-learning provides a simple updating
process, in which the agent starts with an arbitrary initial Q-value ( , )tQ s a for all
,s S a A  . After executing action a at state s, the agent receives an immediate
reward r and then transits to a new state s and updates the new Q-value at time step
t+1 as follows :
1( , ) ( , ) [ max ( , ) ( , )]t t t t t t
a
Q s a Q s a r Q s a Q s a 

    
(1 ) ( , ) [ max ( , )],t t t tt
a
Q s a r Q s a  

     (2.13)
where  [0,1)t  is the learning rate and  [0,1)  is the discount factor. The process
is repeated so that the agent can learn its own optimal policy. Note that the Q-value in
equation (2.13) can converge to *( , )Q s a under the assumption that all states and
actions have been visited infinitely often. The optimal policy is given by
( ) max ( , ).
a
s Q s a   (2.14)
It can be seen that Q-learning provides a simple procedure to
learn optimal policy in single-agent RL systems.
2.5 Multi-agent in non-cooperative game
Multi-agent systems differ from single-agent systems in that there are many
different agents that are supposed to learn a task and that all of the agents’ actions
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affect the environment. Thus, each agent needs to maintain observation of its
environment and as well as the other agents in order to learn the optimal policy.
Therefore, the Q-learning algorithm for single agent is extended to consider other
agent’ actions as well.
The author in (Hu and Wellman, 2003) proposed the Nash Q-learning (NashQ)
algorithm, by extending Q-learning to a non-cooperative situation where each agent
can rationally decide its action whether it will cooperate with other agents or not by
considering both its own and other agents’ information as well.
2.5.1 The action-value function
Instead of finding an optimal action to maximize one single agent’s
reward as the single-agent Q-learning, NashQ seeks joint actions that yield the best
possible reward for all agents. For a two-agent system, the action-value function for
agent i becomes 1 2( , , )i iQ s a a , where i=1,2.
The objective of the agents in the NashQ algorithm is to learn their
best mutual response policy, which is defined by the Q-values received from Nash
equilibrium (NE). NE is not only used to decide the agent’s own action policy, but
also predict the other agent’s action, given by 1 1 2 2( ), ( )s s   where ( )i s  is agent i’s
distribution over the set of actions at state s . NashQ then calculates a NE for the
stage game 1 2( ( ), ( ))t tQ s Q s  and updates its Q-values according to
1
1 2 1 2 1 2( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ) [ ( , , )],t t t t t ti i i i i i iQ s a a Q s a a r NashQ s a a         (2.14)
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where 1 2( , )a a is a joint action, tir is an immediate reward for agent i in the state s
under this joint action and 1 2( , , )ti iNashQ s a a   is the Q-value of agent i in the next state
is for selecting joint action received from Nash equilibrium, which is defined by
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( )t ii i t iNashQ s a a s Q s a a s           (2.15)
In order to calculate the Nash equilibrium, agent i must observe the
other agent’s immediate reward and previous actions and updates its conjectures on
the other agent’s Q-value, by maintaining its own update on the other agent’s Q-
value:
1
1 2 1 2
1 2
( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )
                                   [ ( , , )],    .
t t t
j j j j
t t t
j j j
Q s a a Q s a a
r NashQ s a a j i

 
  
    
(2.16)
NE can be found in a pure-strategy equilibrium, where an agent is able
to achieve the best response to the other agent’s choice. However, not all games have
pure-strategy equilibrium (Daskalakis et. al., 2009). Under this circumstance, the
agents need to select their strategies randomly according to some probability
calculated from the Lemke-Howson method (Shoham and Brown, 2009) to achieve
the NE. Such equilibrium is called mixed-strategy equilibrium (see Appendix A for
more details).
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Figure 2.3 The Nash Q-learning algorithm (Hu and Wellman, 2003).
2.5.2 Convergence
NashQ requires two conditions in a stage game during learning to
converge (Hu and Wellman, 2003).
1) The stage games encountered during learning have a global optimal
point, which is defined as a point of joint strategy in the stage game which every
agent receives its highest payoff at this point, or
2) They all have a saddle point which is defined as a point of joint
strategy in the stage game which is a NE point, and each agent would receive a higher
payoff when at least one of the other agents deviates.
However, both the global and saddle points may not always be
satisfied for these conditions because of both points may not exist in every stage
game. Another limitation is that in selecting NE under a mixed strategy, NashQ
algorithm resorts to a mixed strategy selection where the Nash equilibrium is
Initialize:
Let t = 0, get the initial state s0.
Let the learning agent be indexed by i.
For all s S and , 1, 2i ia A i  , let 1 2( , , ) 0.ti iQ s a a 
Loop
Choose action .tia
Observe 1 2 1 2, ; , ,t t t tr r a a and 1ts s 
Update 1tiQ  for i=1,2
1
1 2 1 2 1 2( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )) [ ( , , )],t t t t t ti i i i i i iQ s a a Q s a a r NashQ s a a        
where 1 2( , , )ti iNashQ s a a   is defined in (2.15)
Let t := t +1.
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probabilistically selected according to the Lemke Howson method (Shoham and
Brown, 2009). Their algorithm showed that convergence can still be established with
such relaxed convergence conditions.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of the non-cooperative game theory and the multi-
agent Q-learning algorithm called NashQ are given. Both algorithms are used to
determine the packet forwarding strategies in non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs in
this thesis. By considering joint actions, the agents can rationally determine the best
mutual policy and receive fair benefit for all agents in multi-domain WSNs.
In the next chapter, a packet forwarding formulation in non-cooperative multi-domain
WSNs is presented. Non-cooperative game theory based Lemke Howson method is
used to study the conditions which equilibriums can exist and its performance is
evaluated under common sink scenario.
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CHAPTER III
PACKET FORWARDING IN COMMON SINK MULTI-
DOMAIN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS USING
NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
3.1 Introduction
Routing has been a challenging issue addressed in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) mainly due to the scarcity of energy and on-board resources. In recent years,
applications of large scale WSNs are becoming a reality. Examples include smart
grids (Zaballos et. al., 2011; Fadel et. al., 2015), the Internet of Things (Mattern et.
al., 2011; Mulligan 2010) and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications networks
(Fan et. al., 2011; Niyato et. al., 2011). It is possible that multiple sensor networks can
coexist independently within a region of interest without conflicting each other. These
networks may even be physically overlapping and their sensor nodes may be
interleaved. Such networks are referred to as multi-domain wireless sensor networks
(WSNs). These networks could potentially gain certain benefits, such as alternative
routing paths and reduced energy consumption, if their sensor nodes share resources
which can prolong their lifetime. Many existing works consider resource allocation
problems in multi-domain WSNs (Shamani et al., 2013; Jelicic et al., 2014; Singhanat
et al., 2015; Kinoshita et al. 2016). All of these works showed that resource sharing
and fully cooperation between multiple different networks, result in reduced energy
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consumption and increased network lifetime. However, because of possible selfish
behaviors among sensor nodes to conserve their energy, cooperation between sensor
nodes belonging to different network authorities may not always be readily available.
Furthermore, it is also possible that, under certain situations, node cooperation will
not be beneficial to any network in the multi-domain WSN. Vaz et al., (2008) and Ze
et al., (2012) showed that cooperation between two different networks that are
deployed in the same region may not always be beneficial to both networks. This is
because whether or not each agent will cooperate depends on the configuration of
each network, network connectivity and how hostile the environment is. Previous
works have proposed a centralized packet forwarding scheme in Non-cooperative
multi-domain WSNs. However, the centralised operation is not scalable. In this thesis,
our focus is thus on determining a distributed resource allocation scheme for Non-
cooperative sensors in multi-domain WSNs which allow each individual sensor to
decide its packet forwarding strategy in a distributed manner allowing a more scalable
implementation.
In this chapter, we introduce the application of game theory to address the
issue of Non-cooperative distributed resource allocation problem in multi-domain
WSNs. In particular, game theory can be used to analyse the interaction and
determine a set of strategies among rational agents, where each agent uses available
information to decide its behaviour. The major advancement that has driven much of
the development of game theory is the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) which is
used to determine a suitable and fair strategy for all agents (AlSkaif et. al., 2015).  NE
is a set of strategies for each of the agents such that each agent’s strategy is the best-
response to the other agents’ strategies. In a game where there is only a single unique
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NE, the game is said to have a pure strategy form. However, there are games where
no pure NE exists. In such games, there may not be any pure strategy that provides the
maximum payoff for all agents (i.e., an agent always attains higher payoff than other
agents). Therefore, in such games, each agent can choose its pure strategy with a
certain probability, which results in a (probabilistic) mixed strategy equilibrium.
Many researches focus on the problem of stimulating cooperation between
WSNs. Ref. Wu et al. (2005) and Miller et al. (2005) applied game theory to packet
forwarding in multi-domain WSNs problems by using incentive mechanisms to
motivate cooperation between sensor nodes. Incentive mechanism such as using trust
values are used to encourage cooperation packet forwarding among nodes. On the
other hand, (Felegyhazi et al., 2005) and (Yang et al., 2007) applied the Non-
cooperative game algorithm to determine a situation which cooperation can exist in
multi-domain WSNs without any incentive mechanisms. Cooperation may exist only
when it achieves mutual benefits for every network. The rational for this is that
cooperation is advantageous in certain situations when the payoff exceeds the actual
costs of cooperation. Therefore, there is no need to use incentives to cooperate in
every situation. Ref. (Felegyhazi et al., 2005) formulated a packet forwarding game as
a Non-cooperative resource allocation problem. They showed that the Non-
cooperative game algorithm is a suitable framework to determine an equilibrium
strategy for their problem. However, this algorithm requires a centralised operation to
determine the packet forwarding strategy for each agent (in a centralized operation, an
agent refers to the cluster head in each network). Moreover, due to sensor nodes’
communication and energy constraints, a centralized payoff estimation, in which a
single computational node receives all sensor data, is inefficient and not scalable. The
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global information maintained by each agent creates a large amount of overhead.
Hence, a decentralized or distributed algorithms that allow sensor nodes to estimate
their payoff locally to reduce the amount of overhead used would be more practical.
Ref. (Yang et al., 2007) considers the problem of relay selection in a packet
forwarding problem in multi-domain WSNs with selfishly behaving nodes. A payoff
matrix is implemented to compare the amount of energy a node can save. A NE
strategy is then selected based on the payoff matrix. Although their results show that
NE can indeed achieve cooperation, their work is based on a small network with a
single relay node in each network. In practice, a network consists of several tens,
hundreds or even thousands of sensor nodes. Furthermore, the payoff matrix used in
(Yang et al., 2007) did not take into consideration the packet receiving rate (PRR)
despite the fact that their relays must satisfy SNR constraints.
This chapter therefore studies packet forwarding problem between sensor
nodes belonging to multi-domain under Non-cooperative and hostile conditions. For
this purpose, we propose a novel payoff matrix and propose the Non-cooperative
game algorithm to determine the best packet forwarding strategy for all network
authorities in the system. It is worth noting that this thesis considers a localised
distributed approach, as opposed to the centralised approach in (Felegyhazi et al.,
2005), to reduce the amount of communication overhead and achieve scalability. The
proposed payoff matrix in this thesis differs from (Yang et al., 2007) in that it takes in
to consideration of successful packet delivery in terms of the packet reliability ratio,
in addition to the energy savings.
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The underlying objective of this chapter is propose a novel payoff matrix to
determine a mutual strategy for the packet forwarding problem in a Non-cooperative
multi-domain WSNs which enables cooperation in necessary network environments
to achieve packet reliability and to prolong network lifetime as mutual benefits for all
domains. Non-cooperative game algorithm is applied to decide a suitable course of
action for the agents in the packet forwarding game. This chapter will also study the
NE conditions of the packet forwarding strategies in multi-domain WSN and fairness
issues in terms of the energy usage in each domain. In situations where there is no
pure strategy, the well-known Lemke Howson method is used to determine a mixed
strategy for games with two agents (Shoham and Brown, 2009). To evaluate the
performance of Non-cooperative game algorithm, we divide the experiment into two
parts. In the first part, we formulate our packet forwarding game into uniform random
topology framework in order to show that Non-cooperative game theory can be
applied to obtain the best mutual policy in small scale WSNs. The second part extends
the study to a more realistic scenario by replacing Non-cooperative game theory to
tree topology WSNs.
The main contribution of this chapter is three-fold: 1) the distributed packet
forwarding scheme in Non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs; 2) identification of
parameters that effect cooperation between multi-domain networks and fairness of
benefits that the networks can achieve; 3) a novel payoff matrix to be used in packet
forwarding in Non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs.
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3.2 Non-cooperative game
3.2.1 Game theoretic framework
Non cooperative games are game situations consisting of at least two
agents whereby the decision making of an agent involves knowledge of the
interactions or strategies from other agents in the game. Each agent is considered
rational which would undertake actions to gain its own maximum benefits or payoffs.
Each agent independently selects its own action without any prior negotiation which
makes it suitable for non-cooperative behavior in multi-domain WSNs. If a sensor
node has a packet to send to the sink node, that sensor node becomes a source node.
Each source node takes a role of an agent in the game which acts selfishly to conserve
their limited energy supply. Each agent makes its own decision for the maximum
benefit or payoff for its own network.
3.2.2 Packet forwarding game using Non-cooperative game approach
In Non-cooperative Game, each agent can independently decide to
interact with the other agents without any prior agreement or collaborative conditions.
Therefore, it is necessary for each agent to predict actions of other agent in order to
determine its own action, relative to the others. The Non-cooperative game algorithm
(Lasaulce and Tembine, 2011), is a branch of game theory applied exclusively to the
situation where the interests of multiple agents conflict. Such situation may arise in a
multi-domain WSNs, where sensor nodes may wish to forward packets using nodes
from the other domain to conserve their own energy. A basic component in non-
cooperative game is defined by the tuple, ( , , ),I A u where I denotes the set of agents, A
denotes the set of actions (i.e. policies) and u denotes a set of payoff functions. The
solution in the Non-cooperative game algorithm is based on Nash equilibrium (NE)
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which attains the best mutual policy for all agents in the game. The following
notations are defined for a game:
1) Agents refer to source nodes in each network. The source nodes must make
decisions selecting a route to forward a packet to the base station.
2) Action refers to the set of possible actions which can be selected by the agents.
In this research, there are two actions which agents (source) nodes can select, i.e., a
Non-cooperative route or a cooperative route. A Non-cooperative route comprises
nodes with in the same domain only whereas a cooperative route consists of nodes
from other domains as well. Source nodes make their decisions upon the NE from a
matrix of payoff functions which each sensor node maintains.
3) Payoff function is the outcome resulting from the agents’ interaction according
to the selected action. It can be defined in terms of energy savings, energy
consumption or packet delivery.
This chapter proposes a payoffs matrix by improving that in (Yang and
Brown, 2007) by not only considering energy savings for each strategy, but also
taking into consideration the packet receiving rate (PRR) or the packet delivery rate
(Ahmed and Fisal, 2008). The payoff matrix is then used in the Non-cooperative
game presented in the following section.
3.3 Problem formulation
In this section, Non-cooperative game algorithm is formally introduced in
order to find the best mutual policy for packet forwarding in multi-domain WSNs.
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3.3.1 Packet forwarding game
In our model, we assume that there are two different networks in the
multi-domain WSN. Let be the set of nodes in each network such that= { , , … , }, where v is the number of sensor nodes in network i. We assume
that the system operates as a distributed system whereby a source node in each WSN
determines its own behaviour and decides its packet forwarding strategy
independently. The role of each sensor node in multi-domain WSNs is to send its data
measurements (i.e., packets) to neighbouring nodes through multi-hop communication
to a common base station. We assume that two sensor nodes are able to communicate
when they are within transmission range. Even if sensor nodes belong to a different
network, interactions between the agents are assumed. It is also assumed that in each
network, an AODV path discovery scheme is used. When there is a packet to be sent
to the common base station, the source node broadcasts a RREQ message to its
neighbouring sensor nodes in the same domain, which will in turn broadcast the
message to their neighbours until non-cooperatives route to the sink are discovered. In
a similar manner, the source node also discovers cooperative routes by broadcasting
RREQ messages to sensor nodes belonging to the other domain as well. Therefore,
each agent maintains two different routing tables, one for routing within their own
network and the other for routing through coordinated paths with the other network.
The shortest route in the two tables are selected as the action for the source node (i.e.,
the Non-cooperative and cooperative route). Each route incurs an energy cost
associated to it described as follows (as shown in Figure 3.1). From the figure, let a
sensor node from network domain 1, , where j=1,2,..v, be a source node taking a
role as an agent in the game which has a packet to send to its sink1. Suppose has to
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make a decision whether to use the action that uses the non-cooperative route in its
own domain or the action that uses the cooperative route that consists of nodes from
the other domain (i.e. forward its packet to , where k=1,2,..v). The decision to
select which action is based on the energy model in section 3.3.2 and the strategy
decision model in section 3.3.3
Figure 3.1 System model for common sink
3.3.2 Radio model
The energy consumption required for packet forwarding is computed
from the radio model in (Naruephiphat and Usaha, 2008).  The radio model for the
reception cost of agent is given by,
,
( )ji RX elecE b E b  where elecE is the cost in the
radio electronics
elecE = 50 nJ/bits and we assume that b is the size of the measurement
packet transmitted in bits. Therefore, the transmission cost of agent is given by,
,
( , ) ( )
i TX
j
elec ampE b d E b b d      where is the path loss exponent and is the
energy consumed at the output transmitter antenna for transmission range of one
meter, = 10 / / . We assume that the agent sends its packet to a common
base station (called sink) by either its own route or a coordinated route through the
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other network depending on action selected by the agent. The strategy decision is
presented next.
3.3.3 Action decision
In the Non-cooperative game, each agent can independently decide its
own action whether or not to cooperate with the other agent.  A set of actions, which
include all the possible joint actions available in the game, is defined by = { , }
where the shorthand notations refer to the following:
D: The agent does not forward its packet to the other network (i.e. agent chooses
the non-cooperative route) and drops all packets from other network if asked for help
to forward the packets.
F: The agent forwards its packet to the other network (i.e. agent chooses the
cooperative route) and in turn forwards all packets if the other network asked for help
to forward the packets.
Each of the joint actions incurs some cost and payoff associated to it.
In this chapter, we propose a payoff function according to the payoff matrix in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix of interaction between sensor nodes in different domains
The physical interpretation is as follows. Suppose that both domains
choose the action {D,D} where each domain denies cooperating with the other domain
= D = F= D , 0 , −= F − , 0 +( − ) , +( − )
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to forward the other domain’s packets, the there is no energy cost in helping the other
domain. The only payoff is the packet received rate (PRR), , for domain = 1,2
which is the average ratio of correctly received packets at a sink in such path. For a
transmission of a data packet of length b bits, PRR can be expressed as
= (1 − ) , (3.1)
where is the bit error probability for one hop communication using OQPSK
modulation for Zigbee devices operating at 2.4GHz (Ahmed and Fisal, 2008). The
PRR ranges between 0-1 and reflects the benefits in terms of the reliability of the
route. If either agents decides to help the other domain forward its packets, while the
other domain declines to cooperate, the action would be {D,F} or {F,D}. In this case,
the cost of cooperation would be the energy the domain i uses to help forward the
(domain -i) packets to the sink (− ). The minus sign depicts the energy consumed
perceived as a cost of cooperation. The other domain is zero since it does not incur
cost (as it refuses to cooperate) but does not enjoy any benefits of increased PRR. If
both agents agree to cooperate, the action would be {F,F} and the associated payoff is
the PRR ( ) and the net gain in energy savings. The energy saving is determined
from the energy consumption on Non-cooperative path ( ) subtracted by the energy
consumption on cooperative path ( ). Note that a positive net energy gain ( − )
from cooperation and high PRR will result in both agents selecting the cooperative
action {F,F}.
The decision to select a joint action in this Non-cooperative game
depends on the NE with respect to the payoff matrix in Table 3.1.  A joint action of
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the stage game is Nash equilibrium point if every agent receives its highest payoff at
this point. Let ( , ) be a joint action of agents in both domains where ∈ . A
joint action ( ∗ , ∗) is said to be a NE if agent i selecting action ∈ gives the
highest payoff when its opponent selects its best action ∗ where ∈ is an
action of the agent ’s opponent (− ). The NE can be presented as
( ∗, ∗ ) ≥ ( , ∗ ) (3.2)
where ( , ∗ ) is the value of the payoff function under joint action ( , ∗ ) of
agent i.
Typically NE corresponds to a pure-strategy equilibrium, which is a
condition that an agent can choose with certainty an action which achieves the best
response to the other agent’s choice. However, not all games have pure-strategy
equilibrium. Under this circumstance, the agents need to select their actions randomly
according to some probability to achieve the NE. Such equilibrium is called a mixed-
strategy equilibrium. The Lemke Howson method (LH), is the best known method to
solve for mixed-strategy NE between two agents (Shoham and Brown, 2009). The
advantage of LH method is that it is guaranteed to find at least one NE point. In this
thesis, the LH method is therefore used in the Non-cooperative game when there are
multiple NE or when pure strategy NE does not exist. The pseudo code of NCG-LH is
shown in Figure 3.2.
3.3.4 Compared algorithms
In order to evaluate the performance of Non-cooperative game routing
using LH algorithm (NCG-LH) for packet forwarding in multi-domain WSNs, we
compared it with a variations of the AODV routing protocol which is  used in IEEE
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standard 802.15.4 ZigBee protocol stack. In particular, there are two variations of the
AODV scheme compared in this experiment: is the Non-cooperative AODV routing
(No cooperation routing) and the cooperative AODV routing (All cooperation
routing). The Non-cooperative AODV routing uses AODV to discover the least
energy consumption route consisting of nodes within the same domain. On the other
hand, the cooperative AODV routing discovers the least energy consumption route
which consist of nodes from the other domain.
3.4 Experiment results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed NCG-LH
algorithm and investigate the cooperative conditions of the packet forwarding
BEGIN
for topology 1:100
Initialize energy for each node to full battery level
Let t=0
do
Random source node to create data packet
Establish two routing tables using AODV routing protocol
(one table for paths in own network and another one for paths in cooperative networks)
Calculate payoff value for all available action following Table 3.1
Determine strategy using NE and LH method
Sent data packet to sink following its strategy
Let t=t+1
while (at least one node run out of battery )
endfor
END
Figure 3.2 Pseudo code of NCH-LH algorithm
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strategies in multi-domain WSNs. We study its performance under the uniform
random topology and tree topology models.
We consider two WSNs co-existing in the same area, which are deployed in a
multi-domain WSN. In each WSN, the source nodes act as individual agents, which
make their own decisions which route to forward their packets to. Then all immediate
nodes belonging the chosen route act according to the source nodes decision. The goal
of each agent is to maximize the packet delivery within its network to the sink by
based on the energy payoff matrix in Table 3.1. We investigate two scenarios,
uniform random topology and tree topology scenarios. The purpose of studying the
random topology scenario is to investigate how the unguaranteed connectivity
between sensor nodes and the common sink affects cooperation. On the other hand,
the tree topology scenario is studied to study the effect of guaranteed connectivity on
node cooperation. Simulation results are carried out over 100 randomly generated
topologies to avoid performance bias based on a particular topology.
To study the effect of cooperation between nodes in multi-domain WSNs, the
following performance metrics are measured:
1) Cooperation: the ratio of the number of routes using nodes from both domains
to the total number of routes discovered.
2) Packet delivery ratio (PDR): the ratio of the number of data packets received
over the number of data packets sent out.
3) Network lifetime: the time at which the first network node runs out of energy.
4) Fairness: the difference in average energy consumed along a forwarding path
in domain 1 and 2 is used to evaluate the fairness of the algorithms. The discrepancy
in energy usage between the two domains indicates some degree of unfair resource
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allocation between the domains as one domain is utilized more than the other.
Therefore, fairness is achieved when this discrepancy is reduced to zero indicating
that energy in both networks are equally used.
The metrics compared are averaged from the measurements obtained from
both networks.
3.4.1 Uniform random topology
We consider two WSNs co-existing in the same area, which are
deployed in a 500x500 in multi-domain WSNs as shown in Figure 3.3. The
simulation parameters are shown in Table 3.2.
Figure 3.3 Uniform random topology for 100 nodes per domain
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3.4.1.1 Effect of density
In order to identify the parameters which affect cooperation in
multi-domain WSNs, we varied the node density by increasing the number of sensors
in each domain as well as network connectivity (i.e. unguaranteed and guaranteed
connectivity)
Figure 3.4-3.7 presents the performance comparison of NCG-
LH routing algorithm at different node density under uniform random topology.
Figure 3.4 shows the average proportion of cooperation with varying number of
sensor nodes per domain which represents the density of each network. In this figure,
results of only NCG-LH algorithms because All cooperation (which only uses routes
consisting of nodes from both domains) and No cooperation (which only uses routes
consisting of nodes from the same domain) always have a proportion of cooperation
Table 3.2: Parameter setting for uniform random topology
Parameter Value
Number of domains 2
Number of sensors per domain 20, 40, 60, 80, 100
Area size 500x500 m2
Sink position (250,250)
Number of maximum hop 5 hops
Transmission range 100 m
Data load per packet, b 100 bytes
Path loss exponent, σ 2, 4
Number of failed nodes 12-48
Routing protocol AODV routing
Distribution of the sensors Uniform random topology
Random Topology 100
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100% and 0%, respectively. Contrary to the two former algorithms, NCG-LH neither
commits nor declines to cooperate entirely, but NCG-LH rather chooses its action to
cooperate only when both networks can both attain benefits from the NE in the payoff
matrix. Results show that in the case of unguaranteed connectivity, the proportion of
cooperation NCG-LH algorithm is lower when the density of sensor nodes is high.
Thus, when sensor nodes are densely deployed in the area, various paths are available
for their sensors to send packets to the sink, hence, cooperation between both agents is
not necessary. This explains the reduction of cooperative equilibrium as the network
density increases.  As for the guaranteed connectivity case, NCG-LH algorithm
exhibits a rather constant percentage of cooperation as connection and thus a route is
always guaranteed to be discovered. Therefore node density has no clear effect in this
case. This suggests that cooperation is only needed in sparse networks where
connectivity is not guaranteed.
Figure 3.4 Average proportion of cooperation at different node
density under uniform random topology
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Figure 3.5 presents the average successful packet delivery ratio.
From the figure, All cooperation algorithm can deliver packets to the sink with PDR
by 100% for both unguaranteed and guaranteed connectivity. No cooperation
algorithm on the other hand can maintain 100% PDR only when connectivity is
guaranteed. However, in unguaranteed connectivity case, PDR drops significantly
when the network is sparse (20-60 nodes) but increases to 100% as the network
becomes more dense. The proposed NCG-LH did not cooperate entirely but it is able
to maintain 100% PDR for both guaranteed and unguaranteed connectivity cases
under all network densities.
Figure 3.6 depicts the network lifetime. The NCG-LH longer
network lifetime than No cooperation and All cooperation routing algorithms by 9.1
and 16.7% on average, respectively, at 100 nodes per domain without any guaranteed
network connectivity. While No cooperation routing algorithm can has the longer
Figure 3.5 Average packet delivery ratio at different node density under
uniform random topology
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network lifetime than All cooperation routing algorithm when the network density
increases without any guaranteed network connectivity. However, this comes at a
tradeoff of low PDR (Figure 3.5), i.e. with few packets being delivered the energy
used is less and thus the network lives longer (albeit low PDR). In the guaranteed
connectivity case, NCG-LH has a network lifetime comparable to No cooperation
algorithm, and exceeds that of All cooperation by 24% on average. This suggests that
when the routes are guaranteed, cooperation is unnecessary and would result in
wasted energy consumption and reduced network lifetime.
Figure 3.7 displays the fairness of NCG-LH and All
cooperation algorithms. Note that No cooperation algorithm is not shown here as
there is no cooperation among the nodes thus fairness is irrelevant. Figure 3.7
illustrates that the NCG-LH consistently attains better fairness than All cooperation
algorithm by obtaining lower difference in energy consumption between the two
Figure 3.6 Average network lifetime at different node density under
uniform random topology
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domains. NCG-LH decides action based on NE whereas All cooperation always
relies on the other domain to forward its packets despite certain situations where
cooperation may be unnecessary.
3.4.1.2 Effect of hostile environments
We then investigate sensor nodes behaviour in more realistic
environments with various node failure and path loss scenarios. Since WSNs may be
deployed in uncontrollable and hostile environments, they are subject to node failure
which could decrease the reliability of WSNs. Therefore, it is important to study the
effect of node failure in WSNs. Moreover, the effect of hostile environments with
increasing of path loss exponent (PLE) is also evaluated. The node density is fixed at
80 nodes per domain which is a dense network so that the network has high
availability of routes within its own domain.
Figure 3.7 Average difference in energy consumption at different node
density under uniform random topology
51
Figure 3.8-3.11 shows the performance comparison of NCG-
LH algorithms under failure prone and hostile environments for uniform random
topology.  Figure 3.8 depicts the proportion of cooperation. The results show that the
proportion of cooperation by NCG-LH algorithm is higher when node failure and path
loss exponent is increased.  This suggests that cooperation is imperative in harsh
environments.
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Figure 3.8 Average proportion of cooperation in hostile environment under
uniform random topology
Figure 3.9 Average packet delivery ratio in hostile environment under uniform
random topology
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Figure 3.9 shows the average successful packet delivery ratio.
In case of free space with 0-12 failed nodes, the figure shows that the PDR of all three
algorithms are comparable. However, when the number of node failures increases to
24, 36 and 48, the PDR of No cooperation algorithm gradually drops to 80%. On the
other hand, NCG-LH and All cooperation algorithms can maintain their PDR at
100%. The reason is because the cooperation between the two domains which permits
alternative routes to avoid the failed nodes. This clearly shows that cooperation is
necessary when network is prone to node failure. As the path loss exponent increases,
the figure demonstrates that the proposed NCG-LH algorithm can perform as well as
All cooperation algorithm by maintaining PDR at 90% on average. Moreover, NCG-
LH algorithm outperforms No cooperation algorithm by over 24% PDR when the path
loss exponent is 4. Hence, No cooperation cannot maintain acceptable PDR in the
presence of failed nodes and higher PLE. On the other hand, NCG-LH cannot only
maintain high PDR but also in an energy efficient manner as illustrated by the longer
network lifetime than All cooperation algorithm in Fig 3.10. In particular, NCG-LH
can attain an average of 14.8% and 22.5% longer network lifetime than All
cooperation algorithm at PLE 2 (free space) and 4, respectively.
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Figure 3.11 Average difference in energy consumption in hostile environment
under uniform random topology
Figure 3.10 Average network lifetime in hostile environment under
uniform random topology
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Figure 3.11 show that NCG-LH can also attain more fairness
by attaining lower difference in energy consumption between the two domains than
All cooperation algorithm. Moreover, it can be seen that in case of PLE 4 there is
more difference in energy consumption than in the free space case. This because PLE
4 case consumes more energy than in the free space case as seen in the transmission
cost of agent,
,
( , ) ( )
i TX
j
elec ampE b d E b b d      , where  is path loss exponent.
The results obtained from the uniform random topology suggest
that cooperation in multi-domain WSNs are not always be beneficial to any network
and may even waste energy and reduce network lifetime. Cooperation between
networks are beneficial if 1) the networks are sparse and have no guaranteed
connectivity; 2) the networks is prone to faulty nodes which may cause disconnected
routes; 3) in presence of hostile network environment (high path loss). In such
scenarios where cooperation is required, NCG-LH has shown to select suitable actions
giving rise to high PDR and longer network lifetime than algorithms which always
cooperate (All cooperation) and do not cooperate at all (No cooperation).
3.4.2 Tree topology
In this section, we present results of another realistic topology of WSN
deployment for many applications in recent years. In the previous section, the uniform
random topology was more suitable for random deployments such as scattered sensor
placements in a large area (e.g., forests, farm land). There are other applications
which required structured tree topologies which also ensure guaranteed connectivity
in large coverage areas (Guizani et al., 2015).
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Therefore this section, the tree topology for multi-domain WSNs is
investigated. We consider two WSNs co-existing in the same area, which are
deployed in a 3000x3000 as shown in Figure 3.12. The simulation parameters are
shown in Table 3.3. Because tree topology requires guaranteed connectivity, we
therefore consider only this scenario in this section.
Figure 3.12 Tree topology for 100 nodes per domain
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3.4.2.1 Effect of density
The performance of all algorithms in guaranteed connectivity
scenario at different node density under tree topology are shown in Figure 3.13-3.16.
Figure 3.13 shows that the proportion of cooperation obtained from NCG-LH remains
between 40-45% as the network density increases suggesting that node density has
little effect on cooperation when connectivity to the sink is guaranteed. The observed
cooperation between nodes is due to the energy savings only, not from the presence of
node density in the network.
Table 3.3: Parameter setting for tree topology
Parameter Value
Number of domains 2
Number of sensors per domain 20, 40, 60, 80, 100
Area size 3000x3000 m2
Sink position (1500,1500)
Number of maximum hop 10 hops
Transmission range 100 m
Data load per packet, b 100 bytes
Path loss exponent, σ 2, 4
Number of failed nodes 1-4
Routing protocol AODV routing
Distribution of the sensors Tree topology
Random Topology 100
58
Figure 3.14 presents the average successful packet delivery
ratio. All algorithms can successfully transmit packets to the sink due to the
guaranteed connectivity of the tree topology. Figure 3.15 presents the network
lifetime.   The NCG-LH algorithm can achieve a longer network lifetime than All
cooperation algorithm as the network density increases, while No cooperation
algorithm achieves highest network lifetime. This suggests that at in case of
guaranteed connectivity in tree topology, cooperation between networks is not
necessary. This is because the energy required to cooperate with the other domain is
wasted unnecessarily and will shorten the network lifetime. Figure 3.16 illustrates the
fairness of the best mutual action. It should be emphasized that our proposed
algorithm is still fairer than All cooperation algorithm.
Figure 3.13 Average proportion of cooperation at different node density under
tree topology
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algorithm.
Figure 3.15 Average network lifetime at different node density under tree
topology
Figure 3.14 Average packet delivery ratio at different node density under
tree topology
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3.4.2.2 Effect of hostile environments
To evaluate the performance when the networks are subject to
faulty nodes and path loss exponent with tree topology, we fix the network density to
80 nodes per domain similar to the uniform random topology case. However, the
faulty nodes is limited to a maximum of 4 nodes per domain. This is because of the
specific structure of the tree topology which a failed node is connected close to the
common sink is sufficient to disconnect the rest of the tree.
Figure 3.17-3.20 presents the performance comparison under
hostile environments for tree topology. Fig 3.17 illustrates the proportion of
cooperation. The results show that as node failure and PLE increases, 78% and 83%
of the routes require cooperation for PLE 2 and 4 from NCG-LH algorithm,
respectively. This suggests that cooperation is imperative in failure prone situations
and even more so in hostile environments with increasing path loss exponent. This
Figure 3.16 Average difference in energy consumption at different node
density under tree topology
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because in PLE case, not only may the forwarding route be damaged by failed node
but also significant amount of energy is consumed during packet transmission.
Therefore, interleaving nodes from other domain may help forward their packets.
Figure 3.18 shows the average successful packet delivery ratio.
In case of free space, the figure shows that that NCG-LH algorithm can deliver
packets 100% to the sink as well as All cooperation algorithm when the number of
failed nodes increase. On the other hand, No cooperation algorithm shows a reduced
packet delivery ratio to 63% PDR when the number of failed nodes increases to 4
nodes per domain. When path loss exponent is increased to 4, NCG-LH and All
cooperation algorithms outperform No cooperation algorithm by maintaining 87%
PDR on average, whereas No cooperation can only obtain 56% PDR. This results
suggest that the NCG-LH algorithm can maintain PDR better than No cooperation
algorithm. NCG-LH can also achieve longer network lifetime than All cooperation
Figure 3.17 Average proportion of cooperation at hostile environment
under tree topology
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algorithm by 15.2% when there are 4 failed nodes, and 8.8% when the PLE is 4 as
shown in Figure 3.19.
Figure 3.19 Average network lifetime at hostile environment under
tree topology
Figure 3.18 Average packet delivery ratio at hostile environment under
tree topology
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Figure 3.20 depicts the difference between energy consumption
between the two domains. Results show that NCG-LH algorithm can consistently
attain better fairness than All cooperation algorithm. However, such gain becomes
marginal as the number of failed nodes and PLE increases because NCG-LH
increasingly prefers cooperative routes. Therefore, we observe a NCG-LH
performance approaching that of All cooperation algorithm.
From the results under the tree topology, node density has no
significant effect on cooperation between domains. This owes to the guaranteed
connectivity among the sensor nodes and the common sink despite the varied node
density. However, if the tree topology is prone to failed nodes or harsh path loss
environments, cooperation among nodes can indeed maintain PDR and prolong
network lifetime. NCG-LH can prolong longer network lifetime than All cooperation.
Figure 3.20 Average difference in energy consumption at
hostile environment under tree topology
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However, in harsher environments, cooperation becomes a necessity and NCG-LH
selects its actions to increase cooperation among nodes.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we apply the distributed Non-cooperative game algorithm
based on Lemke Howson method to the packet forwarding game for a multi-domain
WSN to determine the best actions to attain mutual benefits for both networks. The
contribution of this chapter is three-fold; 1) we show that NCG-LH algorithm can be
applied to achieve the best mutual packet forwarding policy in Non-cooperative
multi-domain WSNs in a distributed manner; 2), we evaluate NCG-LH algorithm and
identify parameters that affect cooperation between networks and fairness of benefits
that the networks can achieve; 3) we propose a novel payoff matrix for packet
forwarding game in Non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs.
Results have been evaluated in both the uniform random (unguaranteed and
guaranteed connectivity) and tree topologies (guaranteed connectivity), under varied
node density, failed nodes and path loss exponents. It was found that cooperation was
not always necessarily beneficial to all networks. In particular cooperation is
beneficial is required when 1) the network is sparse and connectivity is not
guaranteed; 2) the network is prone to failed sensor nodes which affect reliability of
the routes; 3) the network is deployed in harsh environments with path high loss.
Under such scenarios, cooperation among nodes permits use of diverse routes which
enhance reliability and prolong network lifetime for all networks. On the other hand,
in networks with guaranteed connectivity, results suggest that cooperation is
unnecessary and can result in shortened network lifetime.
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Results show that the NCG-LH algorithm is able to select appropriate actions
to forward the packets. NCG-LH action selection has the adaptability to various
network configuration (network connectivity, node density, failed nodes and path loss
exponent) resulting in high PDR, prolonged network lifetime and fair energy
consumption among the domains. This is due to the selection of NE and the Lemke
Howson method in the NCG-LH framework based on the payoff matrix which takes
into consideration the benefits of all domains.
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CHAPTER IV
FAIR ROUTE SELECTION IN MULTI-DOMAIN WSNS
USING NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY UNDER
SEPARATE SINK SCENARIO
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, multiple WSNs have been constructed within the same
interesting region (Fadel et al., 2015; Rashid et al., 2016).  For such cases, researchers
have been investigating cooperation among sensor nodes belonging different network
authorities which could potentially gain certain benefits. Such benefits include
alternative routing paths and reduced energy consumption, which can prolong their
network lifetime and enhance reliability of packet delivery. Some routing protocols
for multi-domain WSNs have been proposed under common sink scenario
(Felegyhazi et al., 2005;Wu et al., 2005; Vaz et al., 2008; Singsanga et al., 2010). The
sink node is shared by the multiple networks, and located at the center of the area of
interest. The previous chapter introduced the application of non-cooperative game
theory to address cooperation problem in multi-domain WSNs and proposed a routing
algorithm named Non-cooperative game algorithm based on Lemke Howson method
(NCG-LH) algorithm. The performance of the proposed algorithm was evaluated in a
common sink scenario in order to conceptually show that non-cooperative game
theory can be applied to solve the non-cooperative packet forwarding problem in
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distributed multi-domain WSNs. The algorithm was shown to determine a suitable
packet forwarding strategy between multiple domains that can extend the network
lifetime and enhance reliability by using Nash equilibrium (NE) and Lemke Howson
method. However, in the previous chapter, the common sink scenario was
investigated to analysis the solution. In real world WSN applications, each network
normally has its own sink. There are several recent researches solve routing problems
in multi-domain WSNs under separate sink scenario for more realistic formulation
(Yang et al., 2007; Bicakci et al., 2013; Rovcanin et al., 2014; Singhanat et al., 2015;
Kinoshita et al., 2016). Therefore, to evaluate the proposed NCG-LH algorithm in a
more realistic sink scenario is needed.
In this chapter, NCG-LH algorithm in Chapter 3 is evaluated in a multi-
domain WSN with separate sink scenario. Similar to Chapter 3, the parameters that
effect cooperation between multiple co-located WSNs are also studied in this chapter
i.e. network density, node failure, path loss exponent and network connectivity. This
chapter additionally investigated the other parameters that effect cooperation i.e. the
difference in node density in each domain and sink positions. The performance is
compared with 3 existing algorithms including variations of the AODV routing
protocol i.e. 1) the AODV routing with no cooperation, 2) the cooperative AODV
routing 3) an existing algorithm called pool-based routing algorithm (Kinoshita et al.,
2016). While the first two algorithms was adopted from Chapter 3, the last algorithm
takes into account of fair route selection in multi-domain WSNs. The simulation
results are evaluated in uniform random topology only. This is because the proposed
algorithm can distinctly provide the best performance in uniform random topology.
The environment setting, configuration and network model are all the same as
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Chapter 3 except number of sinks and their positions. The results show that by using
the proposed algorithm which provides fair route selection, all networks can gain
longer network lifetime.
The main contributions of this chapter are three-fold: 1) The non-cooperative
game algorithm (NCG-LH) is applied to a non-cooperative multi-domain WSN under
a separate sink scenario; 2) Investigation of fairness in terms of the difference in
energy consumption between domains and comparison between a game theoretic
approach (NCG-LH); and non-game theoretic technique (Pool-based method); 3)
Identification of parameters that effect cooperation between multiple co-located
networks and fairness.
4.2 Simulation results
In this section, we provided the simulation results of the proposed NCG-LH
algorithm performed in Visual C++ environment and investigate the cooperative
conditions of the packet forwarding strategies in multi-domain WSNs under separate
sink scenario. We consider two different WSNs, iN , 1,2i  , co-existing in a multi-
domain WSN. Each WSN domain deployed randomly v sensor nodes, ={ , , … , }, and one sink. The simulation environment is set to be a square area of
2500 m2.  In each time step, each WSN chooses randomly a source node to send data
packet to its sink. Source node acts as an agent of the packet forwarding game to
determine a fair routing policy by using Nash equilibriums (NE) to achieve a policy in
order to prolong the network lifetime by using the proposed algorithm.
Similarly to Chapter 3, simulations in this chapter are then carried out under
varying number of nodes, number of failed node and path loss exponent as well as
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network connectivity (i.e. unguaranteed and guaranteed connectivity). This is because
these factors can cause connectivity problems which create failure in the forwarding
path thereby reducing the reliability of WSN. Under such scenarios, NCG-LH
exhibits the ability to allocate resource sharing between multiple networks and
determine a fair routing for packet forwarding to eliminate connectivity weakness and
prolong network lifetime.
We compare the proposed NCG-LH algorithm with 3 existing algorithms in 3
metrics including:
 Proportion of cooperation: the ratio of the number of cooperative
routes to the total number of routes discovered.
 Network lifetime: The lifetime of each network. Since each time step, a
packet is transmitted, this thesis thus measures the network lifetime in terms of the
total number of time steps that data packet transmitted at the sink node until the first
node dies.
 Fairness: the difference in average energy consumed along a
forwarding path between network domain and . From a fairness point-of-view,
energy in different network domain should be consumed equally. If one domain uses
more energy than the other domain, there will be a discrepancy in energy
consumption between domain 1 and domain 2.
The simulation results are divided into 3 scenarios. The simulation parameters
are shown in Table 4.1. The other environments and configurations are similar to
Chapter 3. Simulation results are carried out over 100 randomly topologies. The
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experimental results are shown in this section obtained from average results from both
domains.
Figure 4.1 Uniform random topology for 100 nodes per domain
Table 4.1: Parameter Setting
Parameter ValueScenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Area size 500x500 m2
Number of domains 2
Number of sensors per domain 20 - 100 80- 240 80- 240
Sink position of [125,250] [125,250] [0,0]
Sink position of [375,250] [375,250] [500,500]
Distribution of the sensors Uniform random
Number of maximum hop 5 hops
Transmission range 100 m
Data load per packet, b 100 bytes
Path loss exponent, σ 2, 4
Number of failed nodes 4-48
Routing protocol AODV routing
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4.2.1 Scenario 1: Cooperation in multi-domain WSNs with separate sink
In this scenario, it is assumed that two different WSNs with the same
configurations are deployed in the same area (see Figure 4.1).  Each network has one
sink. We set a position at (125, 250) for the sink of domain and at (375, 250) for
the sink of domain . Sensor nodes are deployed randomly over the region being
observed.
We first investigate the effect of node density on different routing
algorithms in multi-domain WSNs under separate sink scenario as shown in Figure
4.2-4.4. Figure 4.2 shows the average proportion of cooperation with varying number
of sensor nodes per domain which represents the density of each network. This figure
only show results of NCG-LH and Pool-based algorithms because All cooperation
and No cooperation routing algorithms always have 100% and 0% proportion of
cooperation, respectively. In the case of unguaranteed connectivity, we can observe
Figure 4.2 Average proportion of cooperation at different node density
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that when the node density is increased, NCG-LH tends to demote cooperation
between two different domains from 80% to 40%. It is because the higher the node
density, more paths will be available for sensors to send packets to the sink. So
cooperation between both agents is not necessary. This suggests that cooperation is
required if the density of sensors is low. Moreover, it can be seen that Pool-based
algorithm is comparable to NCG-LH when network density is low. But when network
density is enough to provide multiple paths to send packets to the sink, the proportion
of cooperation from Pool-based is always 50%. It is because Pool-based algorithm
always balances the load between cooperative path and path with no cooperation. In
the case of guaranteed connectivity, the figure shows that the proportion of
cooperation of both NCG-LH and Pool-based routing algorithms are almost constant
as node density increases. This because each network has high connectivity, thus the
cooperation is not required. However, NCG-LH requires 15% less proportion of
cooperation than Pool-based algorithm on average as node density increases to 100
nodes per domain.
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The different cooperation policy in different routing algorithms result
in different network lifetimes are shown in Figure 4.3. In Figure 4.3 (a), it can be seen
that NCG-LH achieves longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation and
No cooperation routing algorithms by 5.1%, 18.14% and 30.4% on average,
(a) unguaranteed connectivity
(b) guaranteed connectivity
Figure 4.3 Average network lifetime at different node density
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respectively, at 100 node per domain. Moreover, All cooperation provides longer
network lifetime than No cooperation in this case. This suggests that cooperative
route sharing is necessary in separate sink, as it helps all domains improve their
network lifetime. Similarly, Figure 4.3 (b) depicts that NCG-LH achieves longer
network lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation and No cooperation routing
algorithms by 6.9%, 35.7% and 17.3% on average, respectively, at 100 node per
domain. Thus, we concluded that NCG-LH which promotes cooperation when
necessary can outperform the other algorithms in terms of network lifetime
unguaranteed and guaranteed network connectivity. In addition, when network
connectivity is guaranteed, fully cooperative route sharing may not always result in
lower network lifetime than No cooperation algorithm.
Another parameter which affects routing algorithm efficiency is
fairness of nodes energy consumption as shown in Figure 4.4. From the figure, NCG-
Figure 4.4 Average difference in energy consumption at different node density
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LH uses NE to determine fair packet forwarding strategies allowing it to achieve fair
route selection in terms of energy consumption. NCG-LH outperforms All
cooperation algorithms and attains a comparable energy consumption as Pool-based
algorithm.
We then investigate the effect of hostile environment in terms of the
number of failed nodes and path loss exponent in multi-domain WSNs under separate
sink scenario as shown in Figures 4.5-4.7. These factors can cause failure along the
forwarding route and can reduce the reliability of WSNs. The experiment is
conducted by fixing density at 80 nodes per domain which is considered a densely
deployed area. The number of failed nodes and path loss exponent (PLE) are varied.
PLE is in the range of 2 to 4 where 2 is for propagation in free space, 4 is for
relatively lossy environments.
Figure 4.5 Average proportion of cooperation in various node failures under
different path loss exponents
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Figure 4.5 shows the average proportion of cooperation by varying the
number of failed nodes per domain with PLE in the range of 2 to 4. The figure depicts
that both algorithms provide more cooperative strategy when number of failed nodes
and PLE increase in order to avoid disconnectivity. However, NCG-LH can prolong
network lifetime than Pool-based algorithm as shown in Figure 4.6. In free space,
NCG-LH achieves longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation and No
cooperation routing algorithms by 4.3%, 16% and 25.5%, respectively, on average as
the number of failed nodes increases. With PLE 4, a similar trend is found in free
space with NCG-LH obtaining longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All
cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms by 9%, 19.6% and 31.2%,
respectively, on average as the number of failed nodes increases. Note that, in case of
PLE 4, NCG-LH attains longer network lifetime than free space case when compared
with existing algorithms. This because NCH-LH takes the path loss exponent
parameter into account in the calculation of energy consumption, then chooses the
action with the maximum energy saves whereas the other existing algorithms do not.
NCG-LH therefore chooses suitable actions that can prolong network lifetime better
than other algorithms.
Figure 4.7 shows average fairness in energy consumption with a
varying number of failed nodes under different PLE.  It can be seen that, even though
NCG-LH and Pool-based algorithms provide different fair packet forwarding policy,
NCG-LH can provide an average energy consumption close to that of Pool-based
algorithm. Moreover, NCG-LH also achieves low discrepancy in energy consumption
compared to All cooperation routing algorithm. This suggest that sharing resources is
not always a fair strategy for both networks.
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(a) free space
(b) PLE 4
Figure 4.6 Average network lifetime in various node failures under different
path loss exponents
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The next section considers the case where node density of both
networks are different. In this scenario, the node density of network is varied
whereas that of network is kept constant.  We investigate the relationship between
cooperative packet forwarding policy and the difference in node density in each
domain.
4.2.2 Scenario 2: Effect of difference in node density in each domain
In real world WSN applications, it is difficult to control equal node
density in each network domain. In some regions, small-scale WSN may be deployed
in the same area with a large-scale WSN. The objective of this scenario is to show the
resource allocation ability of NCG-LH in presence of different node densities in
Figure 4.7 Average difference in energy consumption in various node failures
under different path loss exponents
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multi-domain WSNs. To deal with this issue, simulation is conducted by varying the
density of network 1N from 80 to 240 nodes and fixing density of network 2N at 80
nodes.
Figure 4.8 shows the average proportion of cooperation with varying
number of sensor nodes in . In the case of unguaranteed connectivity, it can be seen
that NCG-LH reduces proportion of cooperation between the two networks as the
network size of network domain increase. It is found that lower cooperation is
attained than the NCG-LH when compared to the case when and have equal
network density at 80 sensors (see Figure 4.2). This is due to high availability of
nodes and routes in domain 1N alone, therefore, there is no need to cooperate with
domain 2 .N In the case of guaranteed connectivity, it can be seen that the average
proportion of cooperation of NCG-LH is relatively constant at 30-32%. This because
Figure 4.8 Average proportion of cooperation at different node density of
network
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each network has strong connectivity, thus cooperation is not required as the network
density of 1N increases. However, Pool-based algorithm shows a constant average
proportion of cooperation at 50% on average for both unguaranteed and guaranteed
connectivity cases. This is because high density in each domain implies strong
connectivity, Pool-based only balances the load by equally using both cooperative
path and non-cooperative path.
(a) unguaranteed connectivity
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Figure 4.9a depicts results unguaranteed connectivity. The figure
shows that NCG-LH has longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation
and No cooperation routing algorithms by 6.2%, 26.6% and 34% on average,
respectively. Similarly, in the case of guaranteed connectivity in Figure 4.9b, NCG-
LH also attains longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation and No
cooperation routing algorithms by 10%, 34.8% and 22% on average, respectively.
Moreover, NCG-LH can achieve fair route selection in energy consumption by
outperforming All cooperation routing algorithms and a comparable energy
consumption with Pool-based algorithm as shown in Figure 4.10.
(b) guaranteed connectivity
Figure 4.9 Average network lifetime at different node density of network
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We also investigate the effect of hostile environment in terms of the
number of failed nodes and path loss exponent in multi-domain WSNs under separate
sink scenario as shown in Figure 4.11-4.13. The experiment is conducted by fixing the
density of network at 160 nodes and fixing density of network at 80 nodes. We
vary only the number of failed nodes and PLE similar to the previous scenario.
Figure 4.10 Average difference in energy consumption at different node density
of network
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Figure 4.11 illustrates the average proportion of cooperation with
varying number of failed nodes per domain under PLE of 2 and 4. It can be seen that
NCG-LH promotes more cooperation between two different domains with increased
failed nodes and higher PLE. Meanwhile, that of Pool-based algorithm is kept
constant at 50% on average. Note that NCG-LH attains less proportion of cooperation
than Pool-based algorithm, yet achieve longer network lifetime than the other
algorithm as shown in Figure 4.12. From the figure, NCG-LH has longer network
lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms by
3.3%, 22.9% and 34.1% on average, respectively, for free space case. Similarly, when
PLE is 4, NCG-LH still has a longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All
cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms by 11.8%, 29% and 37.3% on
average, respectively. It can be seen that NCG-LH is more efficient than the others in
terms of network lifetime improvement in PLE case.
Figure 4.11 Average proportion of cooperation in various node failures
under different path loss exponents
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(a) free space
(b) PLE 4
Figure 4.12 Average network lifetime in various node failures and different
path loss exponents
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Figure 4.13 shows the average difference in energy consumption with
varying number of failed nodes under different path loss exponents.  It can be seen
that NCG-LH is still comparable to Pool-based algorithms in terms of the difference
in average energy consumed between both networks. It is because both algorithms
take fair energy consumption into consideration. Thus, both algorithms outperform
All cooperation. routing algorithm.
4.2.3 Scenario 3: Effect of difference of sink position
This section studies the sink positions that affect cooperation between
multi-domain WSNs. The experiment is still conducted with the same parameter
setting (see Section 4.2.2). The sink positions are moved further away from each other
Figure 4.13 Average difference in energy consumption in various node failures
and different path loss exponents
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by setting the sink node of network domain at (0,0) and at (500,500) over a
square region with 500 x 500 m2.
Figure 4.14 shows the average proportion of cooperation with varying
number of sensor nodes of network . Unguaranteed connectivity, it can be seen that
NCG-LH can reduce proportion of cooperation from 66% to 48% as the network size
of network domain increases to 240 nodes. Interestingly, a higher proportion of
cooperation for NCG-LH is attained when compared to the previous scenario which
the sinks were closer (see Table 4.1). This suggests that when the sink positions are
moved further away from other nodes, more cooperation is needed. In the case with
guaranteed connectivity, the average proportion of cooperation of NCG-LH is almost
constant as number of sensor nodes of network increases. This is due to the
Figure 4.14 Average proportion of cooperation at different node density of
network
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existing strong connectivity in the network which did not require additional
cooperation among nodes.
Figure 4.15 presents the network lifetime performance. Unguaranteed
connectivity, NCG-LH achieves longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All
(a) unguaranteed connectivity
(b) guaranteed connectivity
Figure 4.15 Average network lifetime at different node density of network
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cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms by 4.3%, 20.7% and 39.1% on
average, respectively. Similarly, the guaranteed connectivity case shows that NCG-
LH can achieve longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation and No
cooperation routing algorithms by 3.7%, 25.6% and 17% on average, respectively.
Figure 4.16 shows the average difference in energy consumption with
varying number of sensor nodes in network .  It can be seen that NCG-LH achieved
the lowest difference followed by Pool-based and All cooperation. routing algorithms.
Thus, it can be concluded that in terms of fairness, NCG-LH performs the best
compared with the existing routing algorithms under both unguaranteed and
guaranteed connectivity when sinks are positioned further apart.
Figure 4.16 Average difference in energy consumption at different node density of
network
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We finally investigate the effect of hostile environment in terms of the
number of failed nodes and PLE in multi-domain WSNs under separate sink scenario
as shown in Figure 4.17-4.19.
Figure 4.17 indicates the average proportion of cooperation with
varying number of failed nodes per domain under PLE of 2 to 4. As All cooperation
and No cooperation have 100% and 0% proportion of cooperation, respectively, their
results are not shown. It can be seen that both NCG-LH and Pool-based algorithms
tend to promote cooperation between two different domains in presence of more
failed nodes and higher PLE. Note that NCG-LH has higher proportion of cooperation
than Pool-based algorithm. From Figure 4.18, NCG-LH has longer network lifetime
than Pool-based, All cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms by 3.3%,
22.9% and 34.1% on average, respectively, for free space case. When PLE is 4, NCG-
Figure 4.17 Average proportion of cooperation in various node failures under
different path loss exponents
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LH has longer network lifetime than Pool-based, All cooperation and No cooperation
routing algorithms by 11.8%, 29% and 37.3% on average, respectively.
(a) free space
(b) PLE 4
Figure 4.18 Average network lifetime in various node failures under different
path loss exponents
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In Figure 4.19, NCG-LH still shows attains the least difference in
energy consumption between the two domains, thus outperforming Pool-based and
All cooperation algorithms  when the sinks are moved further away.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, the Non-cooperative game algorithm based on Lemke Howson
method (NCG-LH) algorithm proposed in Chapter 3 is evaluated in multi-domain
WSNs under separate sink scenario. The objective of this chapter is to determine a
fair packet forwarding strategy with the best mutual benefit for all agents and to
investigate parameters that affect cooperation between multi-domain WSNs in
separate sink scenario. The contribution of this chapter is three-fold. First, NCG-LH is
applied to a non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs based separate sink scenario;
Figure 4.19 Average difference in energy consumption in various node failures
under different path loss exponents
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Secondly, investigation of fairness in terms of the difference in energy consumption
between domains and comparison between a game theoretic approach (NCG-LH) and
the non-game theoretic approach (Pool-based method). Finally, identification of
parameters that effect cooperation between multiple co-located networks i.e., network
density, node failure, PLE, network connectivity and sink positions.
The simulation results are divided into three scenarios. The study in scenario 1
is to investigate effect of cooperation in multi-domain WSNs with separate sink. The
results show that when sink node in each WSN is separate, NCG-LH can promote
more cooperation. Moreover, NCG-LH can obtain 4.3%-31.2% longer network
lifetime than the other algorithms as network density, PLE and the number of failed
node increases. Moreover, NCG-LH is comparable to Pool-based routing algorithm
which promotes fair routing selection when compared to All cooperation algorithm.
In scenario 2, the difference in node density in each domain is studied (i.e.
when number of sensors in domain are denser than domain . NCG-LH can
demote cooperation between domains due to the high availability of nodes and routes
in domain 1N . This in turn, helps prolong network lifetime in domain 2N which has
less node density. The results show that NCG-LH obtains 3.3%-37.3% longer network
lifetime than the others as network density, PLE and the number of failed node
increases.
In scenario 3, the effect of sink position is studied. When the sink positions
are moved further away from each other, NCG-LH promotes cooperation between
networks compared to the original position and obtains 2.6%-39.1% longer network
lifetime than the other algorithms as network density, PLE and number of failed node
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increases. In addition, NCG-LH outperforms the other routing algorithms in terms of
fair route selection by attaining the lowest average difference in energy consumption.
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CHAPTER V
FAIR ROUTE SELECTION IN MULTI-DOMAIN
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS USING
CONTINUOUS STATE NASH Q-LEARNING
5.1 Introduction
In multi-domain WSNs, cooperation among sensor nodes belonging different
network authorities could potentially gain certain benefits. Such benefits include
alternative routing paths and reduced energy consumption, which can prolong their
network lifetime and enhance reliability of packet delivery. Most existing works focus
on full cooperation in multi-domain WSNs (Bicakci et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2013;
Jelicic et al., 2014; Singhanat et al., 2015). All of these works showed that resource
sharing and cooperation between sensor nodes in multiple domains, result in reduced
energy consumption and increased network performance. However, Vaz et al., (2008)
and Ze et al., (2012) showed that cooperation between two different networks that are
deployed in the same region may not always be beneficial to both networks. This is
because whether or not each sensor node will cooperate depends on the configuration
of each network, network connectivity and how hostile the environment is. The
previous chapters introduced the application of non-cooperative game theory to
address this issue and proposed a routing algorithm named Non-cooperative game
algorithm based on Lemke Howson method (NCG-LH) algorithm. The algorithm is
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able to suitably determine packet forwarding strategy between multiple domains by
using Nash equilibrium (NE) and Lemke Howson (LH) method. Note that this
approach determines an action that maximizes only the immediate payoff in the
current time step. An agent’s choice of action results in a feedback (payoff or reward)
and a change of state of system. A series of new actions and state changes thus given
rise to a different accumulation of feedback (see Chapter 2). It is therefore interesting
to investigate what happens if an agent can capture effects of actions beyond the next
time step by maximizing the expected future payoff to get a suitable packet
forwarding strategy in the current time step.
To address this issue, a model free tool called reinforcement learning (RL) has
been introduced. In RL, agent can learn a behavior based on its reward (or payoff)
value in the future time step to achieve the optimal strategy (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
In the context of RL framework, an agent systematically learns correct behaviors
online through trial-and-error interaction with other agents in order to achieve the
action that maximizes its expected future rewards. There are several recent researches
which employ RL to solve routing problems in WSNs (Kulkarni et al., 2011 and Al-
Rawi et al., 2015). Each sensor node is assumed to be an agent. Therefore, WSNs
with multiple independent decision-making agents can be considered as a multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MARL) system. Recent researches applied a standard RL
method called Q-learning to solve resource allocation problems in single domain
WSN i.e. under a single network authority (Yang et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2010, Xu et
al., 2015 and Debowski et al., 2016) formulated using MARL framework. Their
results showed that their approach can maximize their network lifetime. On the
contrary, limited research work have investigated in multi-domain WSNs with
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networks controlled by multiple network authorities. Ref. (Rovcanin et al., 2014)
considered scenarios of fully cooperative agents whereas (Singsanga et al., 2010)
considered non-cooperative agents. However, both (Rovcanin et al., 2014) and
(Singsanga et al., 2010) rely on a centralized operation, in which a single
computational node (e.g. cluster head) receives and processes all sensor data, thus
creating a large amount of overhead rendering it impractical for actual WSN
applications. Hence, there is a need for decentralized or distributed algorithms that
allow sensors to estimate their information locally to reduce the amount of overhead
used.
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to propose routing algorithms to
deal with a non-cooperative multi-agent packet forwarding in multi-domain WSNs
which is achieved by learning based on the expected future reward. It should be noted
that learning based on future reward is considered in this chapter instead of immediate
reward of NCG-LH from the previous chapter. The proposed algorithm is based on
game theoretic reinforcement learning (GTRL) in order to select fair packet
forwarding routes that can prolong network lifetime and enhance reliability for non-
cooperative multi-domain WSNs in a distributed manner. Two routing algorithms are
proposed in this chapter. The first algorithm is the Discrete state Nash Q-learning (D-
NashQ), which is an extension of a centralized discrete state NashQ in (Singsanga et
al., 2010) to support distributed multi-domain WSNs by using a payoff matrix derived
in chapters 3 and 4 as reward function for the algorithm. The discrete state space is
defined as the set of the actual battery levels of sensor nodes, which is divided into 3
levels. The other algorithm is the Continuous state Nash Q-learning (C-NashQ) that
considers the state space as continuous state, which is suitable for the continuous state
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of the remaining battery energy of sensor nodes. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no existing work on applying GTRL for fair distributed packet forwarding problem
in multi-domain WSNs. This chapter also evaluates the proposed algorithms and
discusses their network performances. The results show that by using the proposed
algorithms which provide fair route selection, all networks can send their packets
more reliably and gain longer network lifetime.
The main contributions of this chapter are four-fold: 1) Derivation of feature
function to represent the continuous state in continuous state Nash Q-learning; 2)
Proposal of two distributed routing algorithms (D-NashQ and C-NashQ) and their
application to the packet forwarding problem in multi-domain WSNs under separate
sink scenario; 3) Comparison of Nash Q-learning performance in discrete state and
continuous state; 4) Performance evaluation and comparison of C-NashQ and existing
routing algorithms.
5.2 Related work
With the increasing use of WSNs technologies to a wide range of application
scenarios, many researches tend to be more interested in resource allocation problem
in multi-domain WSNs. This is due to cooperative resource sharing between multiple
domain belonging different authorities which can reduce energy consumption and
increase network performance.
Most existing researches consider resource allocation problem in a
cooperative situation, meaning that, the network authorities have to agree on sharing
or providing a common resource in order to increase the benefits of their networks. In
ref. (Bicakci et al., 2013 and Bicakci et al., 2010), the potential benefits of
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cooperation in multiple WSNs are investigated. Linear programming was employed to
find energy efficient path in order to prolong their network lifetime. However, energy
efficient route selection does not always guarantee a prolonged the network lifetime.
Sensor nodes belonging to energy efficient paths tend to have higher traffic load and
consume more energy than other nodes. As a result, such nodes tend to die earlier. In
order to avoid heavily loaded situations. Nagata et al. (2012) proposed cooperation
between multi-domain WSNs by balancing the communication load. Routes with the
maximum value of bottleneck was selected. By doing this, network lifetime can be
extended among multiple domains within the same geographic area. Kinoshita et al.
(2016) proposed a fair cooperative routing method for heterogeneous overlapped
WSNs called “Pool-based” selecting method. An energy pool was introduced to
maintain the total amount of energy consumption by cooperative forwarding. Their
simulation results showed that the proposed method was able to balance the energy
consumption and prolong the network lifetime. Ref. in (Jelicic et al., 2014; Singhanat
et al., 2015) showed benefits of node collaboration in multi-domain WSNs under
practical implementation. The results showed that cooperation with co-located sensor
devices in different networks can increase the network lifetime. In order to handle
non-cooperative behaviors among sensor nodes in multi-domain WSNs, Wu and Shu
(2005) applied the concepts from economics and game theory to propose a
mechanism design (MD) approach. This approach is applied to a packet forwarding
problem in multi-domain WSNs by using incentive mechanisms to motivate
cooperation between sensor nodes. On the other hand, some researches employed
non-cooperative game theory to the packet forwarding problem to describe such a
situation that cooperation can exist in multi-domain WSNs without any incentive
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mechanisms was proposed as both centralized algorithms. Ref. (Felegyhazi et al.,
2005) showed that the Non-cooperative game algorithm is a suitable framework to
determine an equilibrium strategy for their problem. However, one drawback of this
approach is that obtaining a strategy needs significant amount of computational time
to compute the utility for all possible actions of sensor nodes. A two-agent relaying
game was analyzed in a centralized non-cooperative game framework under separate
sink scenario was proposed in (Yang and Brown, 2007). However, their experiment
investigated a small network with two sensors and two separate sinks.
In this chapter, we introduce the application of multi-agent reinforcement
learning (MARL), which is another technique to address the issue of resource
allocation problem in WSNs. MARL is suitable for distributed routing problems. A
standard RL method called, Q-learning has been proposed to determine best routing
strategies when critical network conditions are allowed to vary dynamically. In (Yang
et al., 2013), a MARL-routing approach was proposed to handle sink mobility and
enable direct interactions between WSN and vehicles. Reward functions including
time delay, network lifetime and reliability was designed for learning. Simulation
results showed that their proposed approach achieved better time delay, energy
distribution and delivery rate than comparing routing approaches. Refs. (Hu et al.,
2010, Xu et al., 2015 and Debowski et al., 2016) presented a load-balancing multi-
path routing approach. A MARL technique was employed to learn and find out the
best path to forward packet which considers the number of hops, residual energy and
energy consumption of sensor nodes. Results showed that their approaches can
balance the workload among sensor nodes and prolong the network lifetime.
However, these solutions were directly applied in single-domain WSNs. There are
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only a few researches focus on MARL technique in multi-domain WSNs. Ref.
(Rovcanin et al., 2014) applied Q-learning to solve routing problem for cognitive
networks such networks were co-located heterogeneous WSNs which were fully
cooperative operating in a centralized manner. MARL under centralized manner was
also proposed in (Singsanga et al., 2010), by extending Q-routing to cater a non-
cooperative multi-agent in a packet forwarding problem. The authors applied an
existing algorithm called Nash Q-learning (NashQ) previously proposed in (Hu and
Wellman, 2003) to attain the best mutual policy for all agents in a packet forwarding
game framework. Each agent attempts to learn its Nash equilibrium (NE) online.
Their results suggest that NashQ can learn and determine a suitable packet forwarding
policy in varying network conditions. Moreover, both (Rovcanin et al., 2014) and
(Singsanga et al., 2010) rely on a centralized operation, which was impractical for
storage and computing ability of sensor nodes. Therefore, to the best of our
knowledge none of the existing GTRL researches take into consideration of fair
routing selection in multi-domain WSNs in a distributed manner. Because in a multi-
domain environment, lifetime improvement with cooperation may not be fair to all
domains. It is possible that some WSNs can prolong their network lifetime but for
other WSNs, their network lifetime may be reduced. Therefore, for fair cooperative
routing, it is necessary to take into consideration the energy that sensors in each
domain consume in packet forwarding.
This chapter therefore proposes a fair distributed packet forwarding algorithm
in multi-domain WSNs based on GTRL. In particular, D-NashQ and C-NashQ
algorithms are proposed in this chapter in order to learn a fair packet forwarding
policy based on discrete and continuous battery states. The two algorithms are based
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on the game theoretic reinforcement learning (GTRL) technique to support non-
cooperative behaviors of sensor nodes belonging to different networks. An
introduction to GTRL technique is described in the next section.
5.3 Game theoretic reinforcement learning
5.3.1 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto, 1998) is a machine
learning scheme to provide a framework in which an agent can learn optimal control
policy based on the agents’ past experiences and reward. RL relies on the assumption
that the dynamics of the system follows a Markov Decision Process (MDP) (See
Chapter 2). A MDP models an agent acting in an environment with a tuple (S, A, P,
R), where S is the set of states, A is the set of actions that the agent could take in a
particular state, P is the state transition probability matrix and R is a function of
reward expected from the environment after taking the action a A at state s S and
transiting to next state .s S In MDP, the objective is to find a policy : S A  which
is a mapping of the state set to the action set through interacting with environment to
maximize objective function.
5.3.2 Q-learning
A common RL technique called Q-learning is employed to solve for an
optimal policy in MDPs in single-agent systems. It is a model-free online learning
method that has been applied widely because of its simplicity. It can effectively make
an agent to learn optimal policy through trial and error and can directly converge to
the optimal action-value function (Q-value) through online learning. The key point of
Q-learning is updating Q-value through iteration. An agent takes action a at state s,
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receives reward r, updates the local state with input from the environment, and repeats
the process to learn its own optimal policy. Q-learning provides a simple procedure in
which the agent starts with an arbitrary initial Q-value at time step t=0. The updating
process at time step t+1 is defined as
1
'
' '( , ) (1 ) ( , ) [ max ( , )],t t t t
a
Q s a Q s a r Q s a       (5.1)
where [0,1)  is the learning rate parameter, [0,1)  is the discount factor, tr is
reward at time t and s is the next state that results from taking action a in state s.
Several researches i.e. (Yang et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2010, Xu et al., 2015 and
Debowski et al., 2016) employ Q-learning to solve routing problems in single-domain
WSNs. Each sensor node is modeled as an agent and then the entire wireless sensor
network can be modeled as a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) system. In
order to select the optimal path, each agent selects an optimal neighbor node as its
next hop to forward its data packet to its sink. Their results show that this method can
improve network performances in their system by taking advantage of cooperative
behavior of sensor nodes. However, Q-learning cannot be directly applied to multi-
domain WSNs as cooperative behavior between sensor nodes belonging to different
domains may not always be available. This is due to selfish behavior of sensor nodes
in different networks domain to conserve energy for their own network. Therefore, the
optimal policy for a WSN does not only depend on one domain, but also other
domains located in the same region.
5.3.3 Nash Q-learning
Hu and Wellman (2003) proposed algorithm called Nash Q-learning
(NashQ), an extension of the original Q-learning to a non-cooperative multi-agent
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system. In NashQ algorithm, each agent can rationally decide its own action whether
it will cooperate with other agents or not by considering both its own and other
agents’ information as well. Instead of finding an optimal policy to maximize one
single agent’s reward like the original Q-learning, NashQ looks for joint actions that
yield the best reward for all agents.  The agents attempt to learn their best mutual
policy, which is defined by the Q-values received from Nash equilibrium (NE). NE is
not only used to decide the agent’s own action policy, but also predict the other
agent’s action policy, given by 1( ),..., ( )vs s   where ( )i s  is agent i’s distribution
over its set of actions at state s and v is the number of agents. NE can be found in a
pure-strategy equilibrium, where an agent is able to find the highest mutual utility for
all agents. But in general, not all games have pure-strategy NE. The agents then have
to then decide whether to select their policies randomly according to some calculated
probability to achieve the best response. Such NE behavior is called mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. The Lemke-Howson method (LH) is the best known method to
solve for mixed-strategy NE for two agents (Shoham and Brown, 2009). The
advantage of LH method is that it is guaranteed to find at least one NE point.
In this chapter, we thus employ NashQ into packet forwarding problem
in a non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs in order to find the best mutual policy
which provides the best benefits for all agents in the system. The source node, which
is randomly selected from sensor nodes in the WSN, is modeled as an agent. The
entire WSN can thus be modeled as a multi-agent system. In order to select the
optimal packet forwarding path, each agent selects a fair routing obtained from NE.
Two routing algorithms are proposed in this chapter. The first algorithm
is the discrete state Nash Q-learning (D-NashQ), an extension of centralized discrete
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state NashQ in (Singsanga et al., 2010) to support a distributed multi-domain WSNs.
A payoff matrix derived in chapter 3 is used as a reward function. In D-NashQ, Q-
value functions are estimated in tabular forms for each state or state-action pair.
However, many real-world applications have to deal with MDPs with continuous state
spaces. So Q-learning in discrete state may not be feasible. In such cases, another
algorithm called the continuous state Nash Q-learning (C-NashQ) is proposed. C-
NashQ learns policy by using a proposed feature function that is suitable for
continuous state.
This section briefly introduces the application of RL, original Q-learning
and NashQ to address the issue of non-cooperative resource allocation problem in
multi-domain WSNs. The routing problem for multi-domain WSNs is modeled based
on NashQ present in the next section.
5.4 Routing model based on NashQ approach
The objective of using NashQ algorithm in this chapter is to select an online
fair packet forwarding policy in multi-domain WSNs. The proposed algorithm was
then designed by considering communication cost in multiple route paths in order to
provide maximum savings in energy and network lifetime. Furthermore, the residual
energy of sensor node must be taken into account in order to balance the network load
to achieve fairness. The NashQ algorithm can thus efficiently determine packet
forwarding policy to obtain fair energy consumption for all network domains, prolong
the network lifetime and enhance reliability of packet forwarding. D-NashQ and C-
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NashQ routing algorithms are modeled based on GTRL technique which are
presented below.
5.4.1 Network model
Consider two different WSNs, iN , 1,2i  , deployed in a multi-domain
WSN. Each WSN domain consists of v sensor nodes, = { , , … , }, and one
sink. Our model divides the time into discrete time units called time steps. In each
time step, a source node is randomly selected from sensor nodes in each domain to
generate a data packet and send it to its sink. The source node acts as an agent which
decides a route to send the data packet by using the proposed routing algorithms. This
chapter assumes the following characteristic of each sensor node in the multi-domain
WSNs.
 Two sensor nodes are able to communicate with each other if they are within
transmission range.
 Each sensor node must be aware of its location, neighbor location, its sink
location and also neighbors sink location using an on-board GPS receiver.
 There is a pre-established routing mechanism using AODV routing protocol
to determine two routes: 1) a route that contains nodes from the same domain
as source node and 2) another route containing multi-domain nodes.
 The source node is able to calculate the cost of a transmission, which is the
end-to-end distance from source node to sink.
 The total energy consumption of each sensor node are dissipated only for
data transmission and reception.
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The energy consumption required for packet forwarding is computed
from the radio model in (Naruephiphat and Usaha, 2008).  The radio model for the
reception cost of each sensor node is given by,   ,RX elecE b E b  where
50 /elecE nJ bits is the cost in the radio electronics and we assume that b is the size
of the measurement packet transmitted in bytes. The transmission cost is for each
sensor node given by,      ,TX elec ampE b d E b b d     where σ is the path loss
exponent and 210pJ / bit /amp m  is the energy consumed at the output transmitter
antenna for transmission range of one meter.
In a pre-established routing process, AODV routing protocol, which is used in
IEEE standard 802.15.4 ZigBee protocol stack (ZigBee Alliance, 2015), is employed
to establish available route paths. In the route discovery process, source node
broadcasts Route Request (RREQ) packets to its neighbors in the same domain and
also neighbors in difference network domain. The source node then establishes two
different routes with two different routing tables, one for routing within the source
node’s own network and the other for coordinating paths with the other network
domain (as shown in Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2 System Model
From the figure, sensor node 1
jn where j=1,2,…,v from network domain 1N is
randomly chosen to be a source node taking a role as an agent in the game at time step
t. When 1
jn has a packet to send to its sink1, 1
jn must decide whether to use the non-
cooperative route in its own domain or the cooperative route that consists of nodes
from the other domain. To make a decision, 1
jn calculates the following energy,
including: 1) the end-to-end energy cost along non-cooperative route,
1 2
1 1 1
nc ncnc    ; 2) the energy required at 1jn to forward domain 1N ’s packets
through domain 2N ’s node (i.e. forward its packet to sensor node , where
k=1,2,..v) to sink1, 1s ; and 3) the end-to-end energy used by nodes in domain 1
required to help domain 2N forward domain 2N ’s packets to sink2, 1
c . These
energy values are used to estimate a payoff value that an agent receives in order to
decide which packet forwarding path to choose. The payoff value is used as a reward
function described in section 5.4.2. The optimal packet forwarding path will be
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chosen by the source node depending on strategy decision through D-NashQ and C-
NashQ algorithm, described respectively in section 5.4.3 and 5.4.4.
5.4.2   Action formulation and reward function
For the sake of simplicity, consider a WSN of 2 domains. Let A be an
action space defined as a set of strategies, which include all the possible joint
strategies or actions available in the game. Let the action space for domain iN be is
defined by = { , }, 1,2i  , where the shorthand notations refer to the following:
D: The agent does not forward its packet to the other network (i.e. agent chooses
the non-cooperative route) and drops all packets from other network if asked for help
to forward the packets.
F: The agent forwards its packet to the other network (i.e. agent chooses the
cooperative route) and in turn forwards all packets if the other network asked for help
to forward the packets.
Therefore, the set of joint actions for agent in both domains is {DD,
DF, FD, FF}. The reward function is the feedback from taking a joint action of agent.
The reward function is significant since the objective of learning is to achieve an
optimal policy with the maximum reward. For WSNs, it is a better approach to enable
nodes to not only reduce energy consumption whenever possible, but also transport
the data reliably to a sink. Therefore, reward function can be take energy consumption
and link quality into consideration. A reward function according to the payoff matrix
(derived in Chapter 3) is proposed in Table 5.1. In this table, the agent from domain
1N is the row agent and the agent from domain 2N is the column agent. Thus from
Figure 5.2, 1
jn is the row agent and 2
kn is the column agent. Each agent has two actions
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i.e. to forward (F) or do not forward (D) the packet to the other agent. Each cell of the
matrix contains a pair of values represent the reward of agent 1
jn and 2
kn . The first
value is the reward of agent 1
jn and the second value is the reward of agent 2
kn . For
example, at time step t, if agent 1
jn and 2
kn take action D and D respectively, agent 1
jn
receive reward 1 1
t
r  , whereas agent 2
kn receive reward 2 2
t
r  .
The parameter is the packet received rate (PRR) (Ahmedand and
Fisal, 2008), which is approximated as the probability of successfully receiving a
packet from source node to sink, and = 1,2.  The higher PRR is, the higher the link
quality is. The PRR can be calculated from the bit error rate (BER) follows:
= (1 − ) , (5.2)
where is the bit error probability for OQPSK (Offset Quadrature Phase Shift
Keying) modulation used in IEEE standard 802.15.4 ZigBee protocol stack at
frequency 2.4 GHz. The other parameters in Table 5.1 refer to Figure 5.2. The
quantity nc si i i    denotes the energy reduction obtained from changing from the
non-cooperative route to the cooperative route. The quantity ci i  is the
Table 5.1 Reward function of interaction between sensor nodes in different domains= D = F= D , 0 , −= F − , 0 +( − ) , +( − )
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cooperative energy required for cooperation. Finally, the quantity i i  is the net
energy gain if the source node chooses the cooperate route. If i i  is a positive
value, it means that the cooperative route consumes less energy than the non-
cooperative route. Otherwise, the cooperative path consumes more energy.
5.4.3 D-NashQ approach
In the context of online learning, each agent decides its state s, gets an
immediate reward r and update the Q-value. In general, the state space usually is
defined as a discrete state. The discrete state, Q-value and the updating of Q-value for
D-NashQ are defined as follows.
5.4.3.1 Discrete state definition
In D-NashQ, the state space is defined as the set of the discrete
battery energy of the sensor nodes. Since the battery energy is continuous, we divide
the range of battery energy of each agent into 3 states given by S = {0, 1, 2}. Initially,
the state of each agent is state, “2” meaning full battery level. The game is repeated
until the any agent reaches state “0”, signifying battery depletion of a sensor node in
its domain and the game then ends.
5.4.3.2 Q-value and Q-updating
Through learning, an agent can updates its Q-value which
represents to the reward of each action in a particular state. The optimal forwarding
path then can be selected by choosing from the best mutual Q-value as follows. At the
beginning, the Q-value functions are initialized to 0 1 2( , , ) 0,i iQ s a a  for all
,  ,  1,  2.i i i is S a A i   Let the learning agent be indexed by i=1. Upon a packet
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transmission, at time step t, agent 1
jn (assumed as source node in domain 1N at that
time step) observes the current discrete state, takes its action by selecting
1  or ,a D F and observes its own reward. It then observes the action, reward at the
other agent and observes the next state 1 1s S  , of both agents. Agent 1
jn then
calculates a NE policy 1 1 2 2( ), ( )s s   , where ( )i is  is distribution of agent in domain
iN over its set of actions at state s , for the stage game 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2( ( , , ), ( , , ))t tQ s a a Q s a a and
updates its Q-values as follows
1
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ) [ ( , , )],t t t tQ s a a Q s a a r NashQ s a a         (5.4)
where 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( ).t tNashQ s a a s Q s a a s           (5.5)
1 1 1 2( , , )tNashQ s a a   is agent 1jn ’s Q-values in state s for the selected NE.
Note that 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( , , ) ( )ts Q s a a s       is a scalar. For any stage game, at least one NE
exists in either pure or mixed strategies. In pure strategy NE, an agent can choose
with certainty join action with highest Q-values for itself and the other agent. The
method for selecting mixed strategy NE is the Lemke-Howson method (see appendix
A).
In order to calculate the NE strategy, agent 1
jn must observe the other
agent’s information (i.e. agent 2kn , which is the sensor node in a different network
domain belonging to cooperative route as seen in Figure 5.2) that are immediate
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reward and previous actions and updates its conjecture on the other agent’s Q-
function, by maintaining its own update on the other agent’s Q-function
1
2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ) [ ( , , )],t t t tQ s a a Q s a a r NashQ s a a         (5.6)
where 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( ).t tNashQ s a a s Q s a a s           (5.7)
In D-NashQ, we set the learning rate parameter, 0.01  and the discount factor
0.01  (see Appendix B).
It can be seen that the agent in NCG-LH algorithm in chapters 3 and 4 only
seek a strategy that ontained from NE, 1 2
t t
i iNashU U    , where tiNashU is agent’s
payoff value for the selected NE point and tiU is a payoff matrix of agent i at time step
t (Table 3.1). On the other hand, the agent in NashQ algorithm learns to get a strategy
based on Q-values in state s for the selected NE, 1 2( , , )ti iNashQ s a a   . Moreover,
1 2( , , )ti iNashQ s a a   value is used in improving its own Q-table by updating following
Eq. (5.4) in order to determine a strategy in the next time step.
5.4.3.3 Mutual policy
The Q-learning involves finding a balance between exploration
strategy and exploitation strategy. Each agent uses the -greedy method to select its
action. In this method, each agent selects the NE action with probability 1 (s)t (so
called exploitation) and selects an action randomly with probability (s)t for other
Non-NE action (so called exploration). -greedy probability, (s)t is defined as
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1( ) ,
1 0.1 ( )
t
t
s
K s
 

(5.8)
where ( )tK s is number of visits to state s at time t of agent i. The pseudo code of D-
NashQ is shown in Figure 5.3.
5.4.4 C-NashQ approach
Most RL routing techniques are often modeled as Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs) with discrete state and action spaces to simplify the use of RL
algorithms to find solutions. However, real world problems may have continuous state
spaces. This chapter defines the state space as the set of actual battery energy of the
BEGIN
for topology 1:100
Initialize energy and initial state s0 for each node to full battery level
Let the learning agent be indexed by i.
Let 1 2( , , ) 0ti iQ s a a  for i=1,2
Let t=0
do
Random source node to create data packet
Establish two routing tables using AODV routing protocol (one table for paths in own network
and another one for paths in cooperative networks)
Take action 1 2,a a , receive reward 1 2,r r and next state 1 2,s s 
Update 1 1 2( , , )ti iQ s a a for i=1,2
1
1 2 1 2 1 2( , , ) (1 ) ( , , ) [ ( , , )]t t t ti i i i i i iQ s a a Q s a a r NashQ s a a        
Let t=t+1
while (at least one node run out of battery )
endfor
END
Figure 5.3 Pseudo code of D-NashQ algorithm
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sensor nodes. Since the state value is continuous, quantizing continuous values to
discrete values may obtain suboptimal policies during the learning process. To
address this constraint, we extend the original NashQ algorithm to continuous state
spaces context and proposed continuous state Nash Q-learning (C-NashQ). C-NashQ
approach can learn near-optimal packet forwarding policy that maps a continuous
state space to discrete action space. The objective remains the same as D-NashQ,
which is to prolong network lifetime and enhance reliability of packet forwarding and
obtain fair energy consumption for all network domains in multi-domain WSNs with
distributed manner.
5.4.4.1 Continuous state definition
The continuous state is defined by a feature function
1 2:i iS A A   where i=1,2, which maps a state-action pair to a particular function.
Let 1 2[ ( , , )]i is a aΦ be a feature function matrix. Φ is a matrix of 1 2| | | |A A
dimension. Each element of the feature matrix ,Φ 1 2( , , ),i is a a is called a feature. Let
1 2( , , )i is a a be the feature value of agent in domain iN for state-action pair 1 2( , , )is a a
The characteristic of a good feature is that it should be able to represent states that
continuously respond to changing actions. Thus, feature proposed in this chapter is a
function which models the remaining energy after taking an action in the packet
forwarding process, and is expressed by
1 2 1 2
1 2
( , , ) ( , , )( , , ) ( ) ,t remain i total ii i
initial
E s a a E s a a
s a a route
E
 
 
  
 
(5.9)
where (∙) is an indicator function which is defined by
1 21  ,      ,( )
0 , .
if a route associated to a a is available
route
otherwise


 

(5.10)
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The parameter
remainE is the remaining battery energy for all nodes in the route, totalE is
the total energy consumption for packet forwarding in the route and initialE is the initial
battery energy of sensor nodes in the route. The quantity
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , , )remain i total iE s a a E s a a is the remaining energy after taking an action in
packet forwarding process which is normalized by initialE . The quantity (∙) indicates
the route presence for the agent. If the agent has an available route associated to
action 1 2,a a to send its packet, then ( ) 1,route  meaning that the remaining energy
after taking an action can be determined only when such route exists. Otherwise,
( ) 0.route 
5.4.4.2 Q-value and Q-updating
In C-NashQ, Q-values can be approximated as a feature
function (Geramifard et al., 2013):
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , , ) ,i i i i iQ s a a s a a  (5.11)
where ∈ ℝ is a weight value of agent in domain iN to be adjusted (see Figure 5.4)
in order to achieve a NE point in the action value functions. The action value function
can also be presented in a matrix form given by:
,Q Φ (5.12)
where Φ is the matrix of feature of dimension 1 2| | | |A A .
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At the beginning, the weights of each agent i are initialized to
0 0,i  for all ,  ,  1,  2.i i i is S a A i   Let the learning agent be indexed by i=1. At
time step t, agent 1
jn (assumed as the source node in domain 1N at that time step)
observes the current continuous state, takes its action by choosing a neighboring node
to forward a packet to and observes its own reward. It then observes the action,
reward at the other agent and observes the next state of both agents. Agent 1
jn then
calculates the Nash equilibrium strategy and updates its Q-values as follows
1
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2( , , ) ( , , ),t t tQ s a a r NashQ s a a     (5.13)
where 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( ).tNashQ s a a s s a a s             (5.14)
It can be seen that, when Q-values in C-NashQ is estimated be
a feature function (Eq. 5.11). In particular, 1 1 1 2( , , )tNashQ s a a   in D-NashQ (Eq.5.5) is
changed to Eq. (5.14). Then, agent 1jn needs to calculate  , the temporal difference
(TD) error, which is the difference of Q-value in the previous time step and the
current time step
1
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2( , ,  ) ( , ,  ).t t tQ s a a Q s a a   (5.15)
The feature function 1 2( , , ),i is a a calculated from  which is the weight specifying the
contribution of each feature across all state-action pairs.
1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2( , ,  ).t t t t s a a      (5.16)
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Agent 1
jn then observes the other agent’s immediate reward
and previous actions and updates its conjecture on the other agent’s Q-function, by
maintaining its own update on the other agent’s Q-function
1
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2( , , ) ( , , ).t t tQ s a a r NashQ s a a     (5.17)
The temporal difference (TD) error, , can be determined by
1
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2( , ,  ) ( , ,  ).t t tQ s a a Q s a a   (5.18)
The parametric weight,  , can be updated according to
1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , ,  ).t t t t s a a      (5.19)
In C-NashQ, we set the learning rate parameter, 0.1  and the discount factor
0.25. 
5.4.4.3 Best mutual policy
Both D-NashQ, C-NashQ also use the ε-greedy method to
select actions for each agent. However, when discrete state is not considerated in this
model, ( )t s (from Eq. 5.8) then changed to ( )t a . Each agent selects the NE action
with probability 1- ( )t a for exploitation, and selects an action randomly with
probability ( )t a for exploration policy. -greedy probability, ( )t a is defined as
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1( ) ,
1 0.1 ( )
t
t
a
K a
 

(5.20)
where ( )tK a is number of time action a is selected at time t of agent i. The pseudo
code of C-NashQ is shown in Figure 5.4.
5.4.5 Compared algorithms
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed routing algorithm,
we compared it with 4 routing algorithms which include 1) NCG-LH algorithm which
is proposed in Chapter 3 and 4. NCG-LH is an algorithm that determines packet
forwarding policy by using (non-learning) non-cooperative game theory; 2) Pool-
based routing algorithm (Pool-based) proposed in Kinoshita et al. (2016). This is a
(non-learning) load balancing routing algorithm for multi-domain WSNs; 3) a
classical (non-learning) AODV routing schemes which uses AODV to discover a
route consisting of nodes within the same domain (No cooperation); and 4) a classical
(non-learning) AODV routing schemes which discovers a route that consist of nodes
from the other domain (All cooperation).
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5.5 Simulation results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of two proposed GTRL routing
algorithms, D-NashQ and C-NashQ, and investigate the cooperative conditions of the
packet forwarding strategies in multi-domain WSNs. We use visual C++ to simulate
the proposed routing algorithms. We consider two WSNs existing in the same area
and the simulation environment is set to be a square area with 2500 m2.  Each WSN
domain consists of one sink and 20-100 sensor nodes are deployed randomly. In each
BEGIN
for topology 1:100
Initialize energy for each node to full battery level
Let the agent be indexed by i.
Let t=0
0 Initialize arbitrarityi 
do
Random source node as the agent to create data packet
The agent establish two routing tables using AODV routing protocol
(one table for paths in own network and another one for paths in cooperative networks)
Take action 1 2,a a , receive reward 1 2,r r and next state 1 1 2( , ,  )ti i is s a a   for i=1,2
Update ,  andi i iQ  
1
1 2 1 2( , , ) ( , , )t t ti i i i iQ s a a r NashQ s a a    
where 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( )ti i i i iNashQ s a a s s a a s            
1
1 2 1 2( , ,  ) ( , ,  )t t ti i i i iQ s a a Q s a a  
1
2 2( , ,  )t t t ti i i i is a a     
Let t=t+1
while (at least one node run out of battery )
endfor
END
Figure 5.4 Pseudo code of C-NashQ algorithm
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time step, each WSN randomly chooses a source node to send data packets to its sink.
The source node acts as agent of the packet forwarding game. The objective
determine fair routing policy in order to prolong network lifetime and enhance
reliability in distributed multi-domain WSNs by using the proposed algorithms.
Simulations are then carried out under varying number of nodes, number of
failed nodes and path loss exponent. We compare the proposed algorithm with 4
existing algorithms considering 4 metrics including:
• Proportion of cooperation: the ratio of the number of cooperative routes to the
total number of routes discovered.
• Packet delivery ratio (PDR): the ratio of the number of data packets received
over the number of data packets sent out.
• Network lifetime: The lifetime of each network. Since each time step, a packet
is transmitted,  this chapter thus measures the network lifetime in terms of the total
number time steps that data packet is transmitted at the sink node until the first node
dies.
• Fairness: the difference in average energy consumed along a forwarding path
between network domain 1 and 2.
The simulation parameters are shown in Table 5.2. Simulation results were
carried out over 100 randomly topologies. The experimental results are shown in this
section obtained from average results from both domains.
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5.5.1 Discrete state vs continuous state NashQ
We evaluated two proposed methods, D-NashQ and C-NashQ, in terms
of average network lifetime as shown in Figure 5.5. It can be seen that C-NashQ can
achieve 23.3% longer network lifetime than D-NashQ as the network density
increases. This is because D-NashQ divides battery energy which is continuous value
to discrete states which may obtain suboptimal policy in the learning process.
Moreover, D-NashQ requires a large number of steps to visit of each state-action pair
before converging to an optimal policy resulting in slow convergence speed in the
learning process as shown in Figure 5.6 because D-NashQ approaches the maximum
reward approximately 1 lower than C-NashQ. If the number of steps required to visit
the state-action pairs is not enough, this can result in suboptimal policies. This
problem does not occur in C-NashQ because C-NashQ can learn continuous state
though the feature function that is suitable for representing battery energy which is a
Table 5.2: Parameter Settings
Parameter Value
Number of domains 2
Number of sensors per domain 20 - 100
Area size 500x500 m2
Domain1’s sink position (125,250)
Domain2’s sink position (375,250)
Distribution of the sensors Uniform random
Number of maximum hop 5 hops
Transmission range 100 m
Data load per packet, b 100 bytes
Path loss exponent, σ 2, 4
Number of failed nodes 4-48
Routing protocol AODV routing
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continuous value. Furthermore, C-NashQ does not require as many steps as D-NashQ
to visit of each state-action pair before converging to an optimal policy results in
better convergence speed than D-NashQ.
Figure 5.5 Average network lifetime
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Since C-NashQ is more effective than D-NashQ, we henceforth show
only C-NashQ in performance comparison in the following sections.
5.5.2 Effect of density
Connectivity problems occur frequently in WSNs (Kashi and Sharifi,
2013) since most real world applications of WSNs are deployed in wide spread areas.
Furthermore, random deployments of sensors cannot guarantee connectivity coverage
in the area. Connectivity problems are more likely to arise with fewer number of
sensors deployed. C-NashQ showed its ability to allocate resource sharing between
multiple networks and determine fair routing for packet forwarding to alleviate
connectivity issues and prolong network lifetime.
Figure 5.6 Convergence speed
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Figure 5.7 shows the average proportion of cooperation with varying
number of sensor nodes per domain which represents the density of each network. In
this figure, results of C-NashQ, NCG-LH and Pool-based algorithms because All
cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms always have a proportion of
cooperation 100% and 0%, respectively. It can be seen that all algorithms promote
cooperation at low sensor density and decrease cooperation as the density of sensor
increases. It is because at higher the node density, more the paths will be available for
sensors to send packets to the sink. So cooperation between both agents is not always
necessary. This suggests that cooperation is required if the density of sensors is low.
Moreover, it can be seen that Pool-based algorithm is comparable to C-NashQ when
the network density is low. When network density is enough to provide multiple paths
to send packets to the sink, the proportion of cooperation from Pool-based is always
Figure 5.7 Average proportion of cooperation
125
50%. It is because Pool-based algorithm always balances the load between
cooperative paths and non-cooperative paths.
Figure 5.8 shows the average PDR of the algorithms with a varying network
density. It can be seen from the figure, C-NashQ is comparable to NCG-LH, Pool-
based and All cooperation algorithms with 100% packet delivery ratio as the node
density increases. However, No cooperation algorithm is less reliable than other
algorithms by obtaining only 60%-80% packet delivery ratio at low node density. Its
PDR increases to 100% at high node density. This is because at low node density,
sensors cannot cover the whole target area, so connectivity problem can occur. Hence,
without sharing resources with the other network, No cooperative algorithm attains
lower PDR than other routing algorithms. This suggests that cooperation and sharing
resources between networks can enhance packet delivery ratio.
Figure 5.8 Average packet delivery ratio
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Figure 5.9 depicts the average network lifetime with varying network density. It can
be seen that C-NashQ achieves longer network lifetime than NCG-LH, Pool-based,
All cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms by 20%, 25.1%, 34.5 and
44.3% on average, respectively, at 100 nodes per domain. This because C-NashQ
takes both energy state and energy saving information of each packet forwarding
route into consideration and then chooses the route with best mutual benefit of
expected future reward that results in highest network lifetime improvement.
Another parameter which affects routing algorithm efficiency is the
fairness of node energy consumption as shown in Figure 5.10. From a fairness point-
of-view, energy in different network domains should be consumed equally. If one
domain uses more energy than the other domain, there will be a discrepancy in energy
consumption between domain 1 and 2. As seen from Figure 5.10, C-NashQ is
Figure 5.9 Average network lifetime
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comparable to NCG-LH and Pool-based routing algorithms in fair route selection. On
the other hand, All cooperation algorithm seems unfair. This is because All
cooperation algorithm does not take fairness into consideration but C-NashQ, NCG-
LH and Pool-based routing algorithms do.
5.5.3 Effect of hostile environment
In this section, we study the effect of hostile environment in terms of
the number of failed nodes and path loss exponent. These factors can cause failure
along the forwarding route and can reduce the reliability of WSNs. The experiment is
conducted by fixing the network density at 80 nodes per domain which is a densely
deployed area and varying only the number of failed nodes and path loss exponent.
Figure 5.10 Average difference in energy consumption
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a) free space
b) PLE 4
Figure 5.11 Average proportion of cooperation in various node failures under different
path loss exponents
under different path loss exponents
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Figure 5.11 shows the average proportion of cooperation by varying
number of failed nodes per domain under path loss exponent (PLE). It can be seen
that C-NashQ promotes more cooperation between different domains in presence of
increased failed nodes and higher PLE in order to avoid connectivity problems.
Similar results are observed in NCG-LH and Pool-based routing algorithms for the
same reason.
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a) free space
b) PLE 4
Figure 5.12 Average packet delivery ratio in various node failures under
different path loss exponents
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Figure 5.12 shows the average PDR of the algorithms against a varying
number of failed nodes under different path loss exponents.  In free space, C-NashQ
can maintain 100% PDR which is comparable to NCG-LH, Pool-based and All
cooperation algorithms as the number of failed nodes increases. Meanwhile, No
cooperation routing algorithm can attain 80% PDR at 48 failed nodes per domain.
This is because cooperation by sharing nodes between different networks can provide
alternative routes for transmission of data and can thus improve the packet forwarding
rate. On the contrary, No cooperation routing algorithm has the worst PDR as number
of failed nodes increases. For PLE 4, C-NashQ can maintain 93% PDR comparable to
NCG-LH, Pool-based and All cooperation algorithms as number of failed nodes
increases to 48 nodes. On the other hand, PDR of No cooperation routing algorithm is
only 75%.
Figure 5.13 depicts the average network lifetime with a varying
number of failed nodes under different path loss exponents.  In free space, it can be
seen that C-NashQ achieves longer network lifetime than NCG-LH, Pool-based, All
cooperation and No cooperation routing algorithms by 13.6%, 16.1%, 25.6% and
35.7%, respectively, on average as the number of failed nodes increases. With PLE 4,
similar trends is found as in free space with C-NashQ achieving more network
lifetime than NCG-LH, Pool-based, All cooperation and No cooperation routing
algorithms by 12.3%, 20.6%, 29.6% and 39.8%, respectively, on average as number
of failed nodes increases.
Figure 5.14 shows the average difference in energy consumption with
a varying number of failed nodes under different path loss exponents.  It can be seen
that C-NashQ, NCG-LH and Pool-based have comparable fair energy consumption in
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terms of the difference in average energy consumed along a forwarding path between
both networks.
a) free space
b) PLE 4
Figure 5.13 Average network lifetime in various node failures under
different path loss exponents
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, two routing algorithms are proposed. The first algorithm is the
discrete state Nash Q-learning (D-NashQ), the extension of discrete state NashQ in
(Singsanga et al., 2010) applying to a distributed multi-domain WSNs by using payoff
matrix derived in chapter 3 as a reward function. The other algorithm is the
continuous state Nash Q-learning (C-NashQ), that considers the state space as
continuous state, which is suitable for the continuous state of the remaining battery
energy of the sensor nodes. We compare the performance between D-NashQ and C-
Figure 5.14 Average difference in energy consumption in various node failures under
different path loss exponents
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NashQ. Results show that C-NashQ can achieve 23.3% longer network lifetime than
D-NashQ as the network density increases.
Moreover, this chapter also evaluated C-NashQ with four existing routing
algorithms in separate sink multi-domain WSNs under uniform random topology. The
results show that C-NashQ can determine suitable packet forwarding policies under
various environment factors by promoting cooperation when the density of sensor is
low or in presence of failed nodes and higher path loss exponents, thus improving the
packet delivery ratio. Finally, C-NashQ can prolong the network lifetime by 12.3%-
44.3% on average when the network density, PLE and number of failed nodes
increases.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
6.1 Original contributions and findings
In multi-domain wireless sensor networks (WSNs), resource sharing and
cooperation between sensor nodes belonging to different domain authorities can
prolong the network lifetime and enhance reliability of packet delivery ratio.
However, selfish behaviors of sensor nodes may incur in order to conserve their
energy and such nodes may refuse to cooperate. However, it is possible that
cooperation between sensor nodes belonging to different network authorities may not
always beneficial to any WSN. Hence, the objective of this thesis is 1) to identify the
parameters that effect cooperation between multiple co-located networks and fairness
of benefits that the networks can achieve; 2) to apply non-cooperative game theory to
allocate packet forwarding problem in distributed multi-domain WSNs based on
common sink and separate sink scenarios; 3) to obtain routing schemes which can
achieve the best mutual packet forwarding strategy in non-cooperative multi-domain
WSNs in a distributed manner using game theoretic reinforcement learning algorithm.
The research work carried out in this thesis is divided into three parts: the first
part is designing a payoff matrix that is suitable for non-cooperative packet
forwarding game. A game theory (GT) routing algorithm is proposed in Chapter 3 in
order to select routes in a distributed multi-domain WSN in a common sink scenario.
The second part is applying the GT routing algorithm to a more realistic formulation
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based on a separate sink scenario for a packet forwarding game in multi-domain
WSNs presented in Chapter 4. The last part extends the GT routing algorithm by
adding a learning mechanism based on game theoretic reinforcement learning. New
routing algorithms called D-NashQ and C-NashQ have been proposed in Chapter 5,
which learn policies by taking the expected future payoff into consideration and can
achieve suitable policy in distributed multi-domain WSNs. The original contributions
in this thesis can be summarized as follows.
6.1.1 Chapter 3
The objective of this chapter is
 To conceptually show that non-cooperative game theory can be applied to
the packet forwarding problem in distributed multi-domain WSNs under
the common sink scenario.
This chapter proposes the Non-cooperative game algorithm based on Lemke
Howson method (NCG-LH) algorithm to determine packet forwarding strategy
between multiple domains by using Nash equilibrium (NE). The Lemke Howson (LH)
method is employed to calculate the NE when pure strategy NE does not exist.
 To study parameters that affect cooperation between multiple co-located
WSNs in common sink scenario.
Cooperation by node sharing between multi-domain WSNs may not always
prolong network lifetime for any WSN. The results show that cooperation is
necessary to promote when:
- low network density and without guarantee of network connectivity
- there are failed nodes that can cause failure in forwarding route path
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- hostile environment in terms of higher path loss exponent (PLE)
- uniform random topology without guarantee of network connectivity
Cooperation can provide alternative routes for transmission of data, improve
the packet forwarding rate and prolong the network lifetime. Moreover, the results
suggest that if the networks are dense or have guaranteed of network connectivity
(e.g., tree network topology), a lot of communication cost from collaboration with
other networks can decrease network lifetime. Thus cooperation is not necessary in
this situation.
 To design a suitable payoff matrix for packet forwarding game in
distributed multi-domain WSNs.
A payoff matrix is proposed in NCG-LH algorithm as shown in Table 3.1 in
this chapter. The proposed algorithm was compared with variations of the AODV
routing protocol (i.e. the non-cooperative AODV routing and the cooperative AODV
routing) in distributed multi-domain WSNs under a common sink scenario. The
results show that NCG-LH obtains 12%-24% longer network lifetime than the others
as network density, PLE and number of failed nodes increases in uniform random
topology. Moreover, NCG-LH can achieve 20%-40% more packet delivery ratio than
the non-cooperative AODV routing. Although NCG-LH performances are
comparable to other algorithms in tree topology scenario with a varying network
density, NCG-LH can achieve 16%-18% prolonged network lifetime and achieve
31%-37% of packet delivery ratio more than the others when subject to node failures
and high path loss exponent. Finally, NCG-LH can provide fair energy consumption
to all WSNs in terms of the difference in average energy consumed along a
138
forwarding path between both networks. The results show that NCG-LH always
provide less difference of average energy consumed than the other algorithms.
The main contributions of this chapter are three-fold:
1) A non-cooperative game algorithm (NCG-LH) is proposed to distributed packet
forwarding scheme in non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs based on common
sink scenario.
2) Identification of parameters that affect cooperation between multiple co-located
networks and fairness of benefits that the networks can achieve, including,
network density, node failure, path loss exponent, network topology and network
connectivity.
3) Design of payoff matrix for non-cooperative packet forwarding game in
distributed multi-domain WSNs (proposed in Table 3.1).
6.1.2 Chapter 4
The objective of this chapter is
 To study parameters that affect cooperation between multi-domain WSNs
in separate sink scenario.
NCG-LH algorithm in Chapter 3 is evaluated in multi-domain WSNs with
separate sink scenario, which is a more realistic sink scenario. The performance is
compared with 3 existing algorithms include pool-based routing algorithm (Pool-
based) (Kinoshita et al., 2016), which takes into account of fair energy-aware route
selection in multi-domain WSNs and variations of the AODV routing protocol (i.e.
the non-cooperative AODV routing and the cooperative AODV routing). The
simulation results are evaluated in uniform random topology only. This is because the
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proposed algorithm can distinctly provide the best performance in uniform random
topology.
The results show that when the sink node of each WSN is separated, NCG-LH
promotes more cooperation. Moreover, NCG-LH obtains 4.3%-31.2% longer network
lifetime than the others as network density, PLE and number of failed node increases.
 To study parameters that affect cooperation between multi-domain WSNs with
varying densities in separate sink scenario
- The difference in node density in each domain: When number of sensors in
domain 1 are denser than domain 2, NCG-LH can demote cooperation between
domains due to the high availability of nodes and routes in domain 1N . This in turn,
helps prolong network lifetime in domain 2N which has less node density. The results
show that NCG-LH obtains 3.3%-37.3% longer network lifetime than the others as
network density, PLE and the number of failed node increases.
- The difference of sink positions: When the sink positions are moved further
away from each other, NCG-LH promotes cooperation between networks compared
to the original position. NCG-LH obtains 2.6%-39.1% more network lifetime than the
other algorithms as network density, PLE and number of failed node increases.
In addition, NCG-LH outperforms the other routing algorithms in terms of fair
route selection by attaining the lowest average difference in energy consumption.
The main contributions of this chapter are three-fold:
1) The non-cooperative game algorithm (NCG-LH) is applied to a non-cooperative
multi-domain WSNs based on separate sink scenario.
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2) Investigation of fairness in terms of the difference in energy consumption
between domains and comparison between a game theoretic approach (NCG-LH)
and non-game theory technique (Pool-based routing)
3) Identification of parameters that effect cooperation between multiple co-located
networks and fairness of benefits that the networks can achieve. These parameters
include network density, node failure, path loss exponent, network connectivity,
the difference of node density in each domain and sink position.
6.1.3 Chapter 5
The objective of this chapter is
 To extend the non-cooperative game to determine long-term optimal
strategies by learning from the future payoff
In this chapter, NCG-LH is integrated with a learning mechanism i.e. by using
game theoretic reinforcement learning (GTRL) in order to propose an algorithm
which takes into account future (long term) benefits by allowing the agent learn
strategies based on the expected future payoff (or reward). Two routing algorithms are
proposed in this chapter. The first algorithm is the discrete state Nash Q-learning (D-
NashQ), which is an application of the discrete state NashQ in (Hu  and Wellman,
2003)  to packet forwarding problem in a distributed multi-domain WSN by using
payoff matrix derived in chapter 3 as a reward function. The other algorithm is the
continuous state Nash Q-learning (C-NashQ) that considers the state space as
continuous state, which is suitable for the continuous state of the remaining battery
energy of the sensor nodes.
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 To design state space that is suitable for game theoretic reinforcement
learning algorithm.
The state space in this thesis is defined as the set of the actual battery energy
of the sensor nodes. Three discrete state levels are used in D-NashQ, whereas in C-
NashQ, a feature function is proposed for learning with a continuous state. Results
show that C-NashQ can achieve 23.3% longer network lifetime than D-NashQ as the
network density increases.
 To evaluate the proposed algorithm by comparing with existing routing
algorithms.
This chapter evaluates C-NashQ with existing routing algorithms (NCG-LH,
Pool-based, All cooperation and No cooperation) in separate sink multi-domain
WSNs under uniform random topology. The results show that C-NashQ can
determine packet forwarding policy under various environment factors and improve
packet delivery ratio and prolong the network lifetime 12.3%-44.3% on average when
the network density, PLE and number of failed nodes increases.
The main contributions of this chapter are four-fold:
1) Proposal of two distributed routing algorithms (D-NashQ and C-NashQ) and their
application to the packet forwarding problem in multi-domain WSNs under
separate sink scenario.
2) Derivation of feature function to represent the continuous state in continuous
state Nash Q-learning.
3) Comparison of Nash Q-learning performance in discrete state and continuous
state.
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4) Performance evaluation of C-NashQ with existing routing algorithms.
6.2 Recommendation for future work
6.2.1 Extension of n-domain WSNs
In this thesis, two domain WSNs are investigated in packet forwarding
problems in multi-domain WSNs. However, with the recent advancements in WSNs
application in large areas such as Internet of Things (Mattern and Floerkemeier,
2010), smart grid (Fadel et al., 2015), it is possible that multiple WSNs can coexist in
the same area. For this reason, routing algorithms should support resource allocation
in n-domain WSNs.
6.2.2 Node/sink mobility consideration
In this thesis, the sensor nodes and sinks are assumed static. However,
as an extension of WSN capabilities, the device mobility and the network dynamics
provide a new chain of interesting applications such as healthcare WSNs (Lee and
Chung, 2014; Shen et al., 2016), animal and agriculture monitoring (Bapat et al.,
2017), vehicular WSNs (Bitam et al., 2015). In such applications, sensor may
frequently encounter topology changes. Therefore, routing schemes which can
efficiently locate the sensor devices, establish communication paths and determine the
best mutual strategy for all agents in the multi-domain WSNs are needed.
6.2.3 Extension to heterogeneous WSNs
This thesis investigated homogenous sensor nodes so far. However, in
actual WSNs may differ in many aspects such as sensor devices, battery capacity, data
transmission, operation start time, and so on (Kinoshita et al., 2016; Yaqoob et al.,
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2017). These factors should be taken into consideration in order to determine a
suitable resource allocation policy in multi-domain heterogeneous WSNs.
6.2.4 Application to other resource allocation problems
The proposed algorithm in this thesis so far is focused on the packet
forwarding problem. However, this algorithm may be applied to other resource
allocation problems in multi-domain WSNs which may have limitations of energy.
For instance, the problem of cluster head node selection, which is a representative
node in order to send packets to base station in animal monitoring in mountain
pastures (Llaria et al., 2015). Sensor devices may be set up on-body of each animal
(bovines, sheep and horses) in order to know the location of each animal from each
herd in mountain pastures. If each sensors belong in the same area sends the same
data location to sink, it may waste energy. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can be
applied to the cluster head node selection problem. Game theoretic reinforcement
learning algorithm may be applied to determine a suitable cluster head node by taking
the battery energy into consideration in order to prolong the network lifetime in multi-
domain WSNs.
6.2.5 Testbed performance evaluation
The main objective of this thesis is to show that packet forwarding
strategies in non-cooperative multi-domain WSNs can be achieved by using game
theoretic reinforcement learning algorithm. Results are obtained by simulation using
Visual C++ programming. Therefore, an important future direction is to extend the
framework to implement in an actual sensor network testbed.
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THE LEMKE-HOWSON ALGORITHM
In this section we introduce the Lemke-Howson algorithm that finds Nash
equilibrium of general sum bi-matrix game (Shoham & Brown, 2009). Example of the
game is shown in Table A.1
Two tableaux are required for the two agents in order to solve the game. The term ir is
the slack in the constraint 1yA  and js is the slack in the constraint 1
T
jx B  , so the
following system is obtained:
1
1T
Ay r
B x s
 
 
(A.1)
Thus, the tableaux required are 1r Ay  , stated as Tableaux A and 1 Ts B  stated as
Tableaux B:
Tableaux A:
1 3
2 4
1
1
r y
r y
 
 
(A.2)
Tableaux B:
3 2
4 1
1               0.15
1 0.125
s x
s x
 
 
(A.3)
Table A.1 Payoff matrix of sample game
B
A D F
D 1 , 0 0 , 0.125
F 0 , 0.15 1 , 1
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The r terms are the duals of the x’s, while the s’s are the duals of the y terms, also
known as the slack variables in the system.
The pivoting process start with arbitrarily choosing a variable ix from the
tableaux to bring into the basis. Then, a minimum ratio test determines the slack
variable (or dual) to be removed by considering the coefficients of ix , and the
equation for the slack variable just removed is solved. The remaining equations are
then solved in the chosen tableaux. The dual which left the basis determines the
variable to enter the basis next.
Thus, starting with the variable 1x is arbitrarily brought in, so by the minimum
ratio test, 4s leaves the basis, and solving 4s for 1x gives the following equation:
1 48 8x s  (A.4)
The variable 1x is substituted into the remaining equations of Tableaux B, to produce:
3 2
1 4
1 0.15
8 8
s x
x s
 
 
(A.5)
Since 4s is 4y ’s dual, 4y is brought in, and the pivoting process occurs once
more, modifying Tableaux A in the process.
The procedure terminates when the initial variable chosen to enter the basis,
ix , or its dual, leaves. The resulting tableaux from this iterated pivoting are:
Tableaux A:
3 1
4 2
1
1
y r
y r
 
 
(A.6)
Tableaux B:
2 3
1 4
6.67 6.67
8 8
x s
x s
 
 
(A.7)
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To achieve the NE from the tableaux, the slack variables ir and is are set to 0 and the
resulting values in ix and iy are expressed as probabilities, resulting in the final form
of the NE. Thus, Eq. (A.6) becomes:
3
4
1
1
y
y


(A.8)
And Eq. (A.7) becomes:
2
1
6.67
8
x
x


(A.9)
Then, renormalizing the ix and iy to be proper probabilities,
31 2 4
1 2 1 2 3 4 3 4
( , ),( , )yx x yNE
x x x x y y y y
 
      
(A.10)
And gets the solution
 (0.545,0.455), (0.5,0.5)NE  (A.11)
Or rewrite in NE policy, which is the probability over the agent’s actions
 
 
1
2
0.545  0.455
0.5  0.5




(A.12)
And can the payoff
 
1 2
1 0 0.5
          0.545  0.455
0 1 0.5
          0.5
NashA A   
   
    
   

(A.13)
 
1 2
0 0.125 0.5
          0.545  0.455
0.15 0 0.5
          0.0682
NashB B   
   
    
   

(A.14)
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EFFECT OF LEARNING PARAMETER
In this section, we show how to set learning parameters that affect the NashQ
algorithm proposed in Chapter 5. In NashQ algorithm, each agent has to update its
new Q-value at time step t+1 as follows :
1
1 2 1 2 1 2( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )) [ ( , , )],t t t t t ti i i i i i iQ s a a Q s a a r NashQ s a a         (B.1)
From the equation, it can be seen that the two learning parameters used in the
Q-value update process are:
 Discount factor,  : The discount factor defines how much expected
future reward affects the immediate reward. The discount factor is usually set between
0 and 1. Setting it to 0 means that agent is interested only in the immediate reward and
neglects the long term future reward. As 1  , more weight is placed on the future
reward in the updating process. Hence, the future reward will have more significant
impact on learning the suitable cause of action.
 Learning rate, : The learning rate is set between 0 and 1. It
determines how fast the old Q-value is forgotten, i.e., how much weight is put on the
new Q-value estimate. When  is 0, the Q-value will not be updated, hence nothing
is learned. As 1  , the new Q-value estimate “forgets” the old Q-value more
quickly and take the value of the new estimate 1 2[ ( , , )]t ti i ir NashQ s a a    more rapidly
as well.
To learn the optimal policy in the NashQ algorithm, we therefore study the
effect of both parameters. In the experiment, we set both parameters in the range
between 0-1 and observe which values that achieve the best performance in terms of
network lifetime and packet delivery ratio.
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B.1 Effect of learning parameters in D-NashQ
B.1.1 Effect of discount factor
Figure B.1 Effect of discount factor on network lifetime for D-NashQ
Figure B.2 Effect of discount factor on PDR for D-NashQ
Figure B.1 depicts the effect of the discount factor on the network lifetime for
the D-NashQ algorithm. It can be seen that the discount factor of 0.01 and 0.001
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obtains the best network lifetime while the other discount factors are comparable.
However, when the packet delivery ratio is considered in Figure B.2, it is found that
the discount factor of 0.001 outperform the discount factor of 0.01 in a sparse network
and becomes comparable to other discount factor values when the node density
increases. Therefore, we choose a discount factor of 0.001 which provides the best
network performance.
B.1.2 Effect of learning rate
Figure B.3 shows the effect of the learning rate on the network lifetime for the
D-NashQ algorithm. It can be seen that low values of learning rate obtains longer
network lifetime than higher values of learning rate. Moreover, a learning rate of 0.01
and 0.001 provide the best network lifetime. However, only a learning rate of 0.01 can
maintain PDR at almost 100% when the node density becomes lower, as shown in
Figure B.4.  We thus choose a learning rate of 0.01 at which the algorithm performs
best.
Figure B.3 Effect of learning rate on network lifetime for D-NashQ
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Figure B.4 Effect of learning rate on PDR for D-NashQ
Interestingly, from this experiment, the algorithm performs best performance
at very low values of both learning parameter. This is because each agent must learn
Q-values for a large number of state-action pairs ( n nS A , where n is the number of
agents). The finer the state quantization is in D-NashQ, the slower the learning rate to
attain the optimal policy should be. Otherwise, a step size too large may not allow
convergence to the optimal policy.
B.2 Effect of learning parameters in C-NashQ
B.2.1 Effect of discount factor
Figures B.5 and B.6 indicate the effect of the discount factor on the
network lifetime and packet delivery ratio, respectively, in C-NashQ algorithm. It can
be seen that the discount factor of 0.25 outperforms the other discount factor values in
terms of network lifetime and packet delivery ratio. Therefore, we choose discount
factor of 0.25.
161
Figure B.5 Effect of discount factor on network lifetime for C-NashQ
Figure B.6 Effect of discount factor on PDR for C-NashQ
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B.2.2 Effect of learning rate
Figure B.7 shows the effect of learning rate on the network lifetime for
the C-NashQ algorithm. From the figure, a learning rate of 0.1 achieves the longest
network lifetime while a learning rate of 0.001 attains the shortest. Moreover, a
learning rate of 0.1 also maintains the PDR almost 100% as shown in Figure B.8. We
thus choose a learning rate of 0.1 which gives the best performance.
From all results, it is shown that the performance of the proposed algorithms
are sensitive to the selection of learning rate. If the learning rate is set too high, the
algorithm can oscillate around the optimal policy and become unstable. If the learning
rate is too small, the algorithm takes too long to converge. This experiment also
suggests that C-NashQ prefers high value of discount factor and learning rate than D-
NashQ. This because C-NashQ does not require as many time steps as D-NashQ to
visit each state-action pair since it can learn the continuous state though the feature
function. Therefore, it does not require a small value of learning rate to perform best.
Figure B.7 Effect of learning rate on network lifetime for C-NashQ
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Figure B.8 Effect of learning rate on PDR for C-NashQ
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